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In critical discourse surrounding the poetry of William Wordsworth, it has
become generally acceptable to describe the course of the poet’s career by means of a
theory of “decline.” In its most common form, this theory argues that Wordsworth’s best
poetry was written during one “Great Decade” (1798-1807)—an isolated epoch of
prolificacy and genius. His subsequent works, it is argued, neither surpass nor equal his
initial efforts; the course of his career after 1808 may be best described in terms of
declivity, ebb, and decline.
Due to its ideological complicity with the very texts it engages, and due to its
construction as a “myth” of criticism, the theory of decline ultimately becomes a
reductive premise that precludes understanding Wordsworth’s apparent downtrend as a
complex but explicable process. This study therefore seeks to provide a critical
explanation for the process of decline so often observed in Wordsworth’s poetry. In
essence, I contend that the perceptible downtrend in Wordsworth’s verse is the direct
consequence of continuous, career-long processes of revision or self-editing. This selfediting took two forms: First, the explicit form, whereby Wordsworth actually emended
his poetry; and second, the implicit form, whereby Wordsworth sought, through his
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poetry, to amend his self-image by constructing an autobiography tailored to fit an
idealized poetic identity.
This analysis thus reveals and explicates Wordsworth’s possible motives for
revision—the fluctuating demands made upon the poet by the poet himself. Because
these demands represent the operative (if unstable) principle underlying specific textual
changes, one may infer from their character the reasons why Wordsworth’s later poetry
suffers in revision. By attending to the process whereby earlier verse was continually
revised in order to fit a conceptual or poetic context for which it was not originally
intended, I demonstrate how the actual substance of Wordsworth’s poetry was
compromised or attenuated through a reductive (re)appropriation of its own materials.
Unlike many critics, I do not treat Wordsworth’s revisions as the signifiers of
some external change. Instead, my approach keys upon the conflict between
Wordsworth’s efforts to realize a stable poetic identity and the representational and
rhetorical limitations of poetic form, particularly with regards to autobiography. Drawing
on the work of Susan Wolfson, Paul de Man, and Harold Bloom, I argue that
Wordsworth’s revisionary practices are motivated by an agonistic process best described
as “autobiographical anxiety” or the “‘anxiety of influence’ turned inward.” Ultimately, I
conclude that Wordsworth’s decline was the consequence of an overarching ethic of
composition which, because it privileged revision as a means of changing not only poetry
but the poet himself, allowed self-consciousness to become a self-defeating agent.

iv

Introduction
In book three of the 1805 version of The Prelude, William Wordsworth—poet,
narrator, and explicit subject of the poem—pauses to survey his progress:
And here, O friend, have I retraced my life
Up to an eminence, and told a tale
Of matters which not falsely I may call
The glory of my youth. Of genius, power
Creation, and divinity itself,
I have been speaking, for my theme has been
What passed within me. . . .
Yet each man is a memory to himself,
And therefore, now that I must quit this theme,
I am not heartless; for there’s not a man
That lives who hath not had his god-like hours . . . (1805 3.168-74, 189-92)
Despite the apparent finality of the lines above, and despite their almost epitaphic
summation of a theme which, according to the poet, has now been “told” and must be
“quit,” abandoned, and allowed to pass away and die, this particular “eminence” is only
preliminary. We are only halfway to the crossing of the Alps in Book VI, ten books and
thousands of lines removed from the climactic ascent of Mount Snowdon. The pinnacle
above is but one of a series of interconnected peaks which punctuate Wordsworth’s
sprawling autobiographical epic. One should not assume, however, that this moment’s
anteriority precludes any relevance to the whole: ultimately, each eminence prefigures
and contains its successor. The theme which Wordsworth seemingly quits does not perish
but proliferates. Thus, while the poet’s childhood, like his “Residence at Cambridge,”
may have passed, the concerns evident within that narrative—“the glory of . . . youth,”
“genius, power, / Creation, and divinity itself”—are perpetually exigent. In The Prelude,
chronology is a screen and a trope for the poet’s present; Wordsworth’s attempts to
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reconstruct the past are genuine but always mediated. “Each man,” he declares, “is a
memory to himself.”
For Wordsworth, memory is consistently the site and source of solace.
Nevertheless, this moment, by acknowledging the distance between past and present
selves, reveals his deeply ambivalent attitude toward retrospection. Delving into the past
may be a restorative process, but it also produces an awareness of what has been lost.
“Each man is a memory to himself,” removed from “the glory of youth,” and while the
poet may profess faith in poetry’s capacity to bridge that gap and recoup former glory, his
veneration of those “god-like hours” clearly implies profound doubt as to whether they
can be equaled, much less surpassed.
The operative terms of this passage—binaries of youth and old age, past and
present, loss and restoration—not only indicate many of the poet’s primary concerns, but
also predict, with almost uncanny accuracy, the character of subsequent criticism. It is not
simply that critics have treated these subjects in analysis--this is a given. Rather, a
considerable body of critical discourse has actually internalized and reduplicated these
terms, tropes, or patterns of thought, employing or applying them as frames for
understanding the poet and his career. Wordsworth’s own modes of reflection, the
conceptual apparatus of his consummately autobiographical verse, have structured the
way critics think about his poetry. Just as the poet distinguishes between early and late
selves, the critic divides the poet and his career into early and late phases; just as he
speculates on the resplendent glory of youthful, “god-like” hours, the critic argues that
his best work falls within one golden “Great Decade”; and just as the poet worries about
loss, implicitly suggesting that one might not be able to recapture what once was, the
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critic affirms that Wordsworth’s later career is characterized by decisive decline in poetic
power.
The “Great Decade” and its corollary, the theory of decline, have become
pervasive presences in Wordsworth criticism. Yet despite their ubiquity, and despite
notable efforts to justify—or reject—the implied binary view of the poet, the
compositional processes behind the poet’s alleged decline remain relatively unexplored.
The goal of this study is therefore to provide a critical explanation for the process of
decline so often observed in Wordsworth’s poetry. I will uphold the widely accepted
(though certainly not undisputed) judgment that his early poetry is of greater quality, but
will qualify this assertion by describing how the quality of those initial poetic products
was attenuated or otherwise compromised. Ultimately, I seek to demonstrate that the
perceptible downtrend in Wordsworth’s verse is the direct consequence of continuous,
career-long processes of revision or self-editing. This self-editing took two forms: First,
the explicit form, whereby Wordsworth actually emended his poetry; and second, the
implicit form, whereby Wordsworth sought, through his poetry, to amend his self-image
by constructing an autobiography tailored to fit an idealized poetic identity.
While a considerable amount of my argument will rely upon a comparative
analysis of different versions or permutations of poetic texts, the point of the enterprise
goes beyond simply tracking textual changes in order to pronounce one “better” than the
other. Instead, analysis should reveal and explicate Wordsworth’s possible motives for
revision—the fluctuating, shifting, and evolving demands made upon the poet by the poet
himself. Because these demands, which constitute the idealized poetic identity referenced
above, represent the operative (if unstable) principle underlying specific textual changes,
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one may infer from their character the reasons why Wordsworth’s later poetry suffers in
revision. The last portion of my argument confronts therein the ultimate contingency and
uncertainty of all aesthetic judgment. Nevertheless, by attending to the process whereby
earlier verse was continually revised in order to fit a conceptual or poetic context for
which it was not originally intended, one can sufficiently demonstrate how the actual
substance of Wordsworth’s poetry was compromised or attenuated through a reductive
(re)appropriation of its own materials. The diminishment of Wordsworth’s poetic
products was not (as many have speculated) a consequence of flagging “inspiration,” or
changing political perspectives, or the inevitable entropy of aging, but the effect of a
continuous, overarching ethic of poetic composition which, because it privileged revision
as a means of changing not only poetry but the poet himself, allowed artistic selfconsciousness to eventually become a self-defeating agent. The process which would lead
to Wordsworth’s “decline” was present from the beginning, but the same revisionary
ethic which initially yielded his best verse gradually became a burden too heavy for his
poetry to bear.

Chapter 1:
Wordsworth’s “Great Decade” and the Theory of Decline
Literary critics, although methodologically self-aware to a fault, are often hesitant
to acknowledge their complicity with the texts they engage. We write on or about a given
author or text, admitting and even celebrating our dependence upon literature, but
nevertheless impose a boundary between our texts and their subjects, thereby creating
Criticism as a genre apart, possessed of its own ethics, rhetoric, and methods. Although
necessary and productive, this severing of critic and textual object often leads us to
overlook the ways in which criticism engages in discursive practices either similar or
analogous to those found within “primary” or “literary” texts. This is especially true of
those works deemed “creative,” for their discursive methods and purposes appear wholly
dissimilar. Criticism judges, analyzes, and interprets; its purpose is exposition, not
expression. Whereas the novelist, essayist, or poet composes a literary product, critics
write in order to delineate how such products can or ought to be read.
Yet readings are narratives in their own right: the critic, like the author, crafts
stories—meta-narratives whose plots center upon encounters with other texts and,
through them, their creators. While we may question, reflect upon, or otherwise analyze
these narratives with greater frequency and rigor, critical texts also function by means of
trope, metaphor, and symbol. The various theoretical developments of the past sixty
years, which have been especially attentive to the manner in which we construct and are
constructed by language, only serve to amplify the point: Ours is a distinctly literary
criticism.

7
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While the literary qualities of criticism are eminently discernable in individual
texts, the most pronounced evidence of these qualities emerges when critical discourse
coalesces around specific works or authors. In such instances, what was originally the
argument of an individual may, by means of repetition (whether positively or negatively
construed), accrue enough weight, notoriety or influence to become part of the collective
narrative, the “story” which defines an author or work and inflects subsequent readings.
When applied to especially prominent authors and texts, the process becomes almost
mythopoeic: like any sub-culture, criticism creates a narrative in order to understand the
relevance and function of an iconic presence. Even when such a myth acts as a locus for
iconoclasm, even when it occasions heated debate (as any “conventional” idea in
criticism will), its power remains intact; for in the very act of engaging the icon, the critic
will inevitably confront the myth. Criticism is not immune to the potency and efficacy of
ideas which one might readily call, in another context, fictions. Just as an artificial world
or a character may help one to understand “objective” realities, so may a constructed idea
or narrative serve to illuminate a text or career. Without any implicit judgment regarding
its validity, what is often described as a theory might well be called an enabling fiction.
Precisely such a fiction informs critical assessments of the poetic career of
William Wordsworth, whose capacious influence and continuing importance to literary
studies are, regardless of one’s opinion of his work, undeniable. Critical conversation
surrounding his work remains vital, variegated, and manifold. Nevertheless, one finds
within that polyvocal, sustained dialogue certain axiomatic continuities—ideas which,
though certainly not new, “yet exist with independent life” and “know no decay”
(Wordsworth 1799 1.286, 87). Perhaps the most prominent of these ideas manifests as a
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narrative which seeks to explain an oft-cited aesthetic judgment concerning the disparity
between his early and late poetry. In brief, it has become generally acceptable, when
discussing the course of Wordsworth’s career, to propound a theory of “decline.” In its
most common form, this theory argues that, while he enjoyed a relatively long and active
career, Wordsworth’s best poetry was written during one “Great Decade” (17981807)1—an isolated epoch of prolificacy and genius. His subsequent works neither
surpass nor equal his initial efforts, and thus, despite his substantial public reputation
later in life, the course of his career after roughly 1808 may be best described in terms of
declivity, ebb, and decline.
Despite its probable familiarity, the claim is striking, especially in terms of
proportions. Unlike the majority of his Romantic compeers, Wordsworth lived a long life:
born in 1770, he did not die until 1850—long enough to outlast the very literary
movement which he had helped to found. Nevertheless, he was almost continually active
as a poet, perhaps publishing even more during his late career than he had during the
lauded early phase. To propose that Wordsworth’s career is defined by one decade is
therefore to assert that forty-two years of composition were more or less fruitless. The
Great Decade theory isolates and elevates a considerable body of verse, but it
concomitantly excludes an incredible amount of poetry. Wordsworth, according to the
narrative, suffered from a forty-two year drought: he was in decline longer than Keats,
Shelley, and Byron were alive.

1

Although critics differ slightly in their dating of the Great Decade (some shifting its beginning to 1797
and some extending it until 1810), the range here mentioned is representative of majority opinion. Because
1798 is the year in which Lyrical Ballads was first published, it may serve as a fairly stable point of
reference.
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Granted, assent to this idea is by no means unanimous; even those critics who
hold to such an assessment do not do so unequivocally. Permutations of the stock
narrative abound, and one would be hard-pressed to locate a critic of Wordsworth who
did not offer his or her own exception to the proposed parameters. Nevertheless, the
essence of the myth—that Wordsworth’s poetry suffered from a terminal downtrend—
remains intact and vital. The Great Decade has become a latent but potent rubric within
Wordsworth criticism. Contemporary scholars, whatever the basis of their approach to or
interest in Wordsworth’s poetry, often cite or allude to the phenomenon directly, as if it
were tantamount to established fact; and even when the concept is not so explicit, one
might detect its influence in a critic’s aesthetic judgments or selection of texts. Indeed,
many would think it strange to deem the narrative of Wordsworth’s decline a “theory” at
all, for the essential aesthetic preference it expresses has been integrated into the
discipline as a whole. Susan Wolfson points out, for example, that the “story of
[Wordsworth’s] decline” has led to a critical climate wherein
earlier and earliest versions gain praise for their vitality and fidelity to the best
“Wordsworth.” Their recovery is the rationale of Cornell’s expensive and elaborate
editions: “Wordsworth’s practice of leaving his poems unpublished for years after
their completion, and his lifelong habit of revision . . . have obscured the original,
often the best, versions of his work.” (75)
The judgments of one publication and its editors do not necessarily represent the views of
an entire discipline. Nevertheless, the very fact that the field’s most rigorous exemplum
of Wordsworth scholarship is dedicated to the “recovery” of “original” poetic products
which have supposedly been “obscured” by “a lifelong habit of revision”2 demonstrates
the extent to which the idea has become an axiom of critical practice.
2

The Cornell editors’ decision to characterize Wordsworth’s revisions as a “habit”—a word which carries
rather obvious negative connotations—further confirms the theory’s predominance.
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Unlike many critical concepts which have rather diffuse, uncertain geneses, the
myth of Wordsworth’s Great Decade may be traced to a single passage from an early
critical work, Matthew Arnold’s 1879 introduction to his selection of Wordsworth’s
poetry. The relevant paragraph, which merits being quoted in full, reads as follows:
Wordsworth composed verses during a space of some sixty years; and it is no
exaggeration to say that within one single decade of those years, between 1798 and
1808, almost all his really first-rate work was produced. A mass of inferior work
remains, work done before and after this golden prime, imbedding the first-rate work
and clogging it, obstructing our approach to it, chilling, not unfrequently, the highwrought mood with which we leave it. To be recognized far and wide as a great poet,
to be possible and receivable as a classic, Wordsworth needs to be relieved of a great
deal of the poetical baggage which now encumbers him. (Arnold 6)
Here, one finds the essence of the Great Decade myth: a comparative aesthetic
assessment of Wordsworth’s early and late poetry ending in the judgment that his corpus
can be (or in Arnold’s case, must be) organized by means of reference to a binary
dynamic of vitality / decline—or, in Arnold’s terms, of a “golden prime” followed by a
“clogging . . . obstructing . . chilling” mass of “poetical baggage.” However, the most
striking element of this passage is Arnold’s rhetoric, which simultaneously invokes
classical archetypes, seasonal motifs, and an entire complex of Romantic metaphors of
poetic expression and inspiration. For example, the phrase “golden prime” is polyconnotative: it both contains an explicit reference to the archetypal “golden age” of
antiquity (associated with innocence, youth, passion, liberty in the absence of
encumbrance) and, by means of “prime,” activates a polysemous chain of associations
intimately linked to ideas of youth; seasonal fecundity, precedence, and order (e.g.,
spring); and primitive or primal states of existence. The verbs “clogging,” “obstructing,”
and “chilling,” though undoubtedly intended to add rhetorical flourish and force to
Arnold’s critique, are similarly resonant, for they invoke what M.H. Abrams has

12
described as Romantic “metaphors of expression”—complexes of imagery and diction
which, in seeking to describe the process of composition or the essence of poetry, rely
heavily upon “physical analogy” (Mirror 47). Wordsworth himself famously described
poetry as “the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings” (Prose 1:126), thereby
figuring the poet as “a container—a fountain or natural spring, perhaps—from which
water brims over” and creating a schema wherein “the internal [is] made external”
(Abrams 47, 48). Arnold’s verbs of blockage and lethargy obviously embody the negative
form of the same tropological tradition. They signify not only the lack of “overflow” but
also its inverse: stagnant or uninspired expression, the poetic equivalent of death.
Youth as a “golden prime,” old-age as deterioration unto death: these are familiar
terms telling perhaps the most common of stories. Yet the very fact that Arnold’s
statement relies upon such generic registers of meaning begins to explain why the Great
Decade is more than a quantitative assessment of a poet’s career. On the surface, it has
the stark, localized character of an aesthetic judgment—and this is probably as Arnold
intended it to be: simple, declarative, and resolute. But when considered as a function of
the language which it elicits, the Great Decade becomes a richly symbolic gesture, the
external signifier of those myths which still inform how we read poetry and poets.
Notice, in the passage above, that it is not the poet who Arnold claims was “obstructed”
but the “reader’s approach” to the poem; not Wordsworth whose “high-wrought mood”
was spoiled but the reader’s that was “chilled.” This shift in subjects, though subtle,
exposes the dialogic relationship between Wordsworth’s poetic language and Arnold’s
critical response. The latter works within and through the former, appropriating its
epistemology and rhetoric in an exchange which is advantageous yet unequal. Criticism
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gains an idiom but concomitantly re-inscribes the limitations of poetic logic upon its own
discourse.
Of course, Arnold’s reliance upon Romantic epistemology and “metaphors of
expression” is neither atypical of nineteenth-century criticism nor, by the standards of
that time, problematic. Romanticism was both a literary and a theoretical phenomenon;
its greatest practitioners were its most discerning and influential critics. One cannot cite
Arnold’s reliance upon Wordsworthian tropes of composition without simultaneously
recognizing that he was heir to a critical tradition which arguably began with
Wordsworth’s 1800 Preface to Lyrical Ballads.
However, Arnold’s proximity and debt to Romantic theory does not interpose a
strict barrier between his concept of Wordsworth’s Great Decade and later iterations of a
theory of decline. Contemporary criticism has questioned, modified, and restructured the
argument but never completely disavowed the central proposition or its premises.
Consequently, one finds that even relatively current evaluations of Wordsworth’s career
retain a genetic resemblance to the theory in its first form. Given criticism’s tendency to
iconoclasm, as well as the sheer range and depth of theoretical developments since the
late nineteenth-century, such longevity seems uncanny: any “myth” which supports an
aesthetic judgment, it stands to reason, would have long ago been supplanted by
rigorously qualified “objective” criteria.
The key to understanding the enduring import of the myth lies in a consideration
of how it has continually acted as an enabling fiction. Ideas do not survive in an
inherently skeptical climate unless they are practicable; whether they are accurate or
speak to some enduring truth is secondary or perhaps even irrelevant. The theory of
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Wordsworth’s decline has endured because it provides an interpretive schema welladapted to the specific exigencies of the surrounding critical conversation.
The exigencies that have not only preserved but amplified the relevance of the
Great Decade stem from two interrelated critical developments which defined the
parameters of twentieth century Wordsworth scholarship. The first consists of the
redemption of a text Arnold deemed part of Wordsworth’s “poetical baggage,” The
Prelude. Whereas many in the late nineteenth century had, like Arnold, deliberately
isolated and elevated the youthful Wordsworth of Lyrical Ballads at the expense of the
more philosophically-inclined, mature poet manifest in later works such as Home at
Grasmere, The Excursion, and The Prelude, critics in the early twentieth century began to
reverse this paradigm, arguing, as Tim Milne explains, “for Wordsworth’s pre-eminent
position in the canon, based on the value . . . of poems such as The Excursion and The
Prelude” (30). This argument for the precedence of what A.C. Bradley calls the
“Wordsworth of the yew-trees” over “the Wordsworth of the daffodils” became one of
the most salient features of twentieth century criticism (qtd. in Milne 31). Largely thanks
to Bradley’s efforts to construct “a hermeneutic ‘shrine’ around The Prelude,” the poem
has become the central text in Wordsworth’s corpus—an almost obligatory locus of study
and scholarship (32).
At first, the new ascendency of The Prelude appears to contravene the aesthetic
primacy granted to Wordsworth’s early poetry. The text of The Prelude upon which
Bradley based his arguments was, after all, first published in 1850—forty-two years after
the poet’s supposed fizzling. Of course, it was well-known that the actual writing of The
Prelude far predated its publication: an 1850 article from the Eclectic Review, for
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example, begins by citing “the public curiosity” which for “well nigh thirty-four years . . .
has been excited by the knowledge that there existed in MS. an unfinished poem, of very
high pretensions, and extraordinary magnitude, from the pen of the late . . . poet-laureate
of Britain” (Norton 547-48). Yet because the actual text of The Prelude was perceived as
a product of Wordsworth’s late career, critics did not typically construe it as an early
work. However, this perception was forever altered, or at least complicated, by Ernest de
Selincourt’s 1926 publication of parallel texts of the 1805 and 1850 versions of The
Prelude. Here, for the first time, The Prelude became both early poem and late
publication: de Selincourt seemed to have revealed, in the very act of placing an
“original” text next to the poem’s standard incarnation, that the work considered
Wordsworth’s crowning achievement had in fact achieved substantial genesis at the crest
of the poet’s early phase of poetic “genius.” The reaffirmation of Arnold’s original thesis,
albeit according to different standards, was already implicit in the dynamic represented
on the page: youth versus old-age, genius as opposed to stagnation, vitality ending in
decline.
The tacit assertions of de Selincourt’s volume become explicit within his
extensive introduction to the text. Although he attempts to maintain a balanced
perspective, even occasionally admitting the superiority of the later poem with such
brusque pronouncements as “No one would doubt that the 1850 version is a better
composition” (lvii), de Selincourt’s ultimate verdict is unmistakable: The 1805 Prelude is
the “original text” composed by a poet in “the fullness of his powers”; the 1850 text, one
of the “more finished but less inspired writings of his later years,” attests to the poet’s
“later deterioration” (xix, ix, lx). Although he cautions the reader not to accept with “too
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much literalness” the superiority of the young Wordsworth, “the obvious truth,” de
Selincourt writes, is “that what is greatest in Wordsworth belongs to a single decade
(1798-1807)” (lix).
One should not hasten to accuse de Selincourt of unscholarly bias: his
introduction, despite its clear preference for the 1805 Prelude, is hardly polemic; and his
comparison of the 1805 and 1850 versions attempts to retain, for the most part, the
balanced approach appropriate to a work of textual scholarship. Of course, other readers
have disagreed: in a much later defense of the 1850 Prelude, Jeffrey Baker describes the
ambivalence present in de Selincourt’s introduction (noted above) as “an astonishing
piece of self-contradiction” and proceeds to locate in that contradiction, which he calls
“the de-Selincourt paradox,” the “origins of the 1805 cult” (“Great Prelude Debate” 22,
emphasis added).3 The paradox Baker cites is the result of a complex clash between
scholarly standards, individual aesthetic judgment, and a modified but still potent version
of the Great Decade myth. The introduction attempts to be objective, fair, and balanced in
its presentation of the texts, but ultimately that objectivity is overridden by the happy
concurrence of the author’s personal judgments and the now-pervasive narrative of
Wordsworth’s career. In a somewhat oblique manner, the presence of the myth is
announced even before de Selincourt’s introduction begins by means of the
frontispiece—a tinted pencil portrait of Wordsworth. Purportedly drawn in 1805, the
portrait presents an image not of the venerable poet laureate but of a youthful
Wordsworth. In the Preface, de Selincourt glosses the frontispiece as follows: “This is the

3

Seemingly mystified by the existence of such a paradox, Baker attempts to explain its source by
describing “the situation in human terms”: “How often,” he asks, “does a literary scholar burst upon the
academic world and announce: ‘I have just discovered a hitherto early version of a well-known poem by X,
and it’s rubbish!’ I don’t say this never happens, but it must be extremely rare” (22).
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only known portrait of the poet in his prime, and its suitability as an illustration to this
volume needs no emphasis” (x). The image thus becomes the icon.
As the portrait and explication make clear, de Selincourt’s version of the myth
retains those basic paradigms established by Arnold. Yet the presentation, operative
terms, character, and rhetoric of the myth have been altered. The most obvious change is
a curtailment of explicitly metaphorical language. For example, de Selincourt does not
appropriate Arnold’s corporealized description of poetic afflatus (e.g., clogging,
obstructing), but instead relies upon a vocabulary consisting of such seemingly innocuous
terms as “inspiration,” “creativity,” and “powers.” At once more direct and more abstract,
such rigidly self-contained parameters seem to permit increasingly analytic distinctions
regarding the object or content of an aesthetic judgment, including the distinction
between “craftsmanship” and “creativity” which underlies the statement that so infuriated
Baker, “that the 1850 version is a better composition” (de Selincourt lvii, emphasis
added). Yet this apparently distilled language does not abandon metaphor so much as it
compresses a complex of images and ideas. The same figures one finds in Arnold are
therefore present in de Selincourt, but in a drastically more compact form.
Accordingly, the most important alteration to the myth consists of the
development of a newly resonant set of descriptors which, though ensconced in the same
conceptual frame as Arnold’s metaphors, manage to contain the myth in a more
unobtrusive, self-effacing rhetoric. De Selincourt’s text repeatedly deploys such phrases
as “true disciple,” “sincerity in style,” “the voice of the authentic Wordsworth,” “original
thought,” “excrescences of a manner less pure” (lx, lxii, emphases added). Though
employed in various contexts, these references to truth, sincerity, authenticity, originality,
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and purity all share a common conceptual antecedent: the notion that what is “true” or
“authentic” in Wordsworth’s poetry is both limited to a specific range or type of
expression and (because it is concealed, distorted, or corrupted) must be actively sought
out. By these means, we discover that de Selincourt perpetuates Arnold’s notion of
“poetical baggage”: if the critic is to isolate and preserve the “authentic Wordsworth,” he
or she must purge his corpus of the detritus left by decline.
The preferred texts have changed; the terms have shifted; the critic is no longer so
unequivocal and brash in his judgments. Nevertheless, the myth endures, retaining—and
in some cases, even amplifying—its genetic relationship to the Romantic tropes from
whence it sprang. De Selincourt is not at all unique in this regard; even the work of his
colleague and successor, Helen Darbishire—whose essay “Wordsworth’s Prelude”
undertakes a much more rigorous analysis of the differences between the 1805 and 1850
texts—reveals the same pronounced debt to Romantic thought:
What matters to us is not so much to understand the experience as to realise it, not so
much to solve the mystery as to see where it lies. This is what the early Prelude helps
us to do. In it Wordsworth told the inner workings of his mind as nakedly and
truthfully as he could; and the changes most to be deplored in the later text are those
which overlay or obscure the naïve immediate expression. They generally mar the
poetry; they always disguise the truth. (qtd. in Milne 33)
Darbishire’s “naïve immediate expression” clearly draws upon the sense of poetic
propinquity manifest in Wordsworth’s own “spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings”
(Prose 1:126). According to both Wordsworth and Darbishire, poetry must maintain a
correspondence or closeness to the object or occasion which it addresses; by these means
it remains a “true” expression, an authentic feeling, and a sincere transcription of the
original experience. The terms are nearly synonymous because they originate in the same
fundamental idea, an idea which was more the creation of poets engaging their own
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creative process(es) than the applied terminology of a separate, subsequent critical
tradition.
After de Selincourt, the critical conversation surrounding Wordsworth’s poetry,
and especially The Prelude, was forever altered. The existence of two distinct versions of
the work which had become, after Bradley, “the essential living document for the
interpretation of Wordsworth’s life and poetry,” both complicated and enriched the field,
offering critics an entirely new means of discerning “the curve of Wordsworth’s poetic
development” (de Selincourt xix, Milne 32). Yet the phenomenon which enabled so much
valuable work also polarized readers, for even those who were led to view The Prelude as
a poem in process felt compelled, as de Selincourt had, to declare one version superior to
the other. For this reason, the theory of Wordsworth’s decline became a more relevant
and forceful idea than it had ever been. The Great Decade myth already promoted a
dichotomous perspective on Wordsworth’s career; now, it could be grafted upon a new
frame. The Prelude—two poems turning upon the same axis yet representing two visions,
two versions of the poet—was for many the concrete illustration of Wordsworth’s
decline. Even as critics probed the differences between the texts and sought to synthesize
more thorough conclusions, the myth was reified, reiterated, and embodied in and
through The Prelude.
The conflict or polarity implicit in the first parallel text edition of The Prelude
became such a staple of Wordsworth studies that even by 1984, sixty years after the
original publication of de Selincourt’s edition, critical conflict was still lively enough to
warrant a formal debate concerning the relative merits of the 1805 and 1850 versions.
Entitled, appropriately enough, “The Great Prelude Debate,” this transcribed
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conversation between some of the most prominent critics in the field demonstrates how,
despite the myriad and manifold theoretical developments of the later twentieth century,
the essential terms of the debate have endured. Proponents of the 1805 Prelude thus tend
to begin with the type of statement which we will, by now, find wholly familiar:
[T]he revisions demonstrate to me that the great poet in Wordsworth survived only in
flashes after 1807, leaving behind an artist adrift, who consistently altered his early
work for the worse, not solely because the Muse had abandoned him, but because he
had abandoned the revolutionary programme of 1800, as set forth in the great Preface.
(Fruman 7)
For Fruman, Wordsworth’s later poetry thus represents not only a diminishment or
decline, but a somewhat deliberate—and therefore more damning—abandonment or
betrayal of the “revolutionary programme” which shaped the poet’s great decade. His
argument for the aesthetic primacy of the 1805 Prelude does not depend so much on
figures of impersonalized inspiration (as announced by the inversion of agency above,
wherein Wordsworth is not abandoned but abandons) as on a demonstration of the ways
in which Wordsworth the laureate corrupted Wordsworth the ephebe. Herbert
Lindenberger, who also speaks in defense of the 1805 version, reaches a similar
conclusion, deeming the revisions a “betrayal of the image of man that dominates the
poem” (2). Both critics provide ample justification for their judgments. Lindenberg, for
example, cites the vitality of the early version, its willingness “to take risks” and “[strike]
out boldly into new areas for poetry” (4)—qualities he finds preferable to the stylistic and
semantic pieties of the 1850 version. Fruman echoes these sentiments, declaring the later
revisions “act[s] of uniformity against the creative mind,” but also provides a rigorous
analysis of the destructive, reductive principles underlying Wordsworth’s changes to the
text (7). These principles, he explains, “constantly promulgated in handbooks of rhetoric
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in his own time and ours . . . work well enough in practical expository composition, but
are hopelessly inappropriate to the work of a great poet, and especially one as strange,
eccentric and original as Wordsworth” (7). As a result, the 1850 Prelude reveals “a poet
engaged in tinkerings which derive from the decayed vocabularies of thought and
response which actually precede the linguistic adventures of his great years” (8). By
1850, Fruman asserts with pithy force, “Wordsworth was no longer a great architect, but
had become an interior decorator” (8).
Despite the apparent efficacy of their analytic criteria, both critics’ arguments
ultimately depend upon a highly contentious aesthetic and ideological axiom: the
authority of the “original” Wordsworth. This is by no means a new development:
Arnold’s “golden prime,” de Selincourt’s “sincerity” or “authenticity,” and Darbishire’s
“naïve immediate expression” all reference the same idea, a notion of primacy which is
both the fount and the primary expression of the myth. Yet for later critics—whose
enterprise has been complicated by increasingly divergent theoretical assertions
concerning the stability of texts, the precise role of the author / poet, and the nature of
reading or interpretation—the matter of textual authority is at once more problematic and
more urgent. In other words, the difficulty of declaring one text “authoritative” acts as an
impetus to do precisely that. For this reason, while Fruman and Lindenberger are
perfectly willing to concede their judgments’ contingency and characterize their support
of the 1805 Prelude as subjective “preference,” they nevertheless work assiduously to
qualify and cement the authority of the early Wordsworth. For them, “original” becomes
a doubly potent concept signifying both what is prior—and therefore deserves priority—
and what is new, innovative, or singular.
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As a result, the crux of dissent between proponents of the 1805 Prelude and those
who prefer the 1850 version is the question of textual authority. Summarizing the
position of the latter group in the debate’s closing remarks, Robert Barth seizes upon the
evocation of bildung in the Prelude’s subtitle, “the growth of the poet’s mind”:
supporters of the 1850 text, he proclaims, “argue for the priority of the later experience,
because it is later, because it is a development out of earlier reflection experience” (36).
Thus, according to Barth and his colleague Jeffrey Baker, the 1850 Prelude is the
“authoritative text” both because it represents the “final” text directly authorized by
Wordsworth and because it is a culmination or completion of the poem’s own
developmental schema. Though this line of argument seems rather doctrinal, and though
one can easily object to such a developmental narrative on the grounds that it assumes
“growth” to be a strictly teleological process, the model of authority proffered by Barth
and Baker is ultimately no less contentious than the alternative, antithetical schema
proposed by Lindenberger and Fruman. Both models privilege an extreme and both invert
the other’s parameters: once again, we find that Wordsworth and his poetry are subject to
a bifurcating narrative of youth and old age, originality and finality, vitality and
eminence. The participating critics’ descriptions of the Prelude as a “poem in process”
may complicate the discussion, but their polarized premises continue to reaffirm a binary
conception of poet and poem. Paradoxically, the parameters of the myth are affirmed
even as its thesis is denied.
Yet because they object to what has become the standard view of Wordsworth,
Barth and Baker are especially aware of the ways in which the emphasis upon
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“originality” has affected criticism and scholarship. “Since Wordsworth’s opinions
supposedly grew more orthodox as he grew older,” Baker explains,
one can, by applying the doctrinal standard, develop a chronological reflex as a
substitute for critical labor. Earlier is better because earlier is more orthodox, more
spontaneous, more authentic. But one does not need to establish these qualities, one
only needs to date the poem, or the passage, or the revision, and the judgment is preprogrammed. (22)
Baker’s diagnosis is accurate. The heart of the problem with the Great Decade myth and
its corollary—the narrative of Wordsworth’s decline—does not lie in the aesthetic
judgment it encourages but in the fact that this judgment has become a “doctrinal
standard” or “chronological reflex” which is often applied without further thought,
without sufficient justification, and without ample consideration of how or why such a
process of decline might have taken place. To revise Baker’s phrasing, the myth or
narrative has become the substitute for a critical explanation of Wordsworth’s career.
The narrative in and of itself is not pernicious, and myths are not necessarily false. (Quite
the contrary, a myth, even a myth of criticism, often represents a sound judgment or a
point at which judgments converge.) But if such narratives or myths are allowed to
harden into dogma, they become impediments to thought. Instead of acting as enabling
fictions, they silence discussion and short-circuit genuine critical inquiry.
Yet the discussion cannot end here. The status of the Great Decade theory as
myth, that myth’s proliferation in critical discourse, and the consequent “chronological
reflex” are but symptoms of a more fundamental problem evident in the preceding
analyses: the tendency of criticism, when it confronts the apparent disparity between
Wordsworth’s early and late work, to adopt and rely upon patently Romantic tropes of
inspiration, creativity, and genius. This is not to say that critics have completely
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neglected to explain their judgments and/or preferences for particular works or versions
of those works: both Lindenberger and Fruman, for example, provide thorough,
convincing arguments to support their claim that the 1805 Prelude is superior to the 1850
version. But when one moves beyond the comparison of specific texts and comes to the
heart of the matter—the overarching aesthetic thesis that is the Great Decade—
explanations are either hasty, perfunctory, or completely absent. Thus, in the majority of
cases, Wordsworth’s decline is deemed a self-evident fact; the ebb of his “poetic powers”
stands as an unsubstantiated assumption. When a rationale is present, its matter and
manner are almost formulaic: Wordsworth’s later poetry lacks “originality” “sincerity,”
or “authenticity”; after 1807, the poet somehow lost his “inspiration,” that creative energy
which animated the early verse; because this phenomenon became even more pronounced
as the poet aged, it must be connected to the corrosive influence of time, which in
depriving Wordsworth of his youth left him subject to the stagnation of old age.
Admittedly, this is a rather harsh synopsis. Nevertheless, it amply demonstrates
how the Great Decade theory, when deployed, activates a series of ideas about the nature
of poets and poetic production which prevent or supplant more rigorous inquiry into the
antecedents or process(es) of Wordsworth’s alleged decline. The specifically Romantic
genealogy of these ideas requires further explanation. Let us, then, consider yet another
iteration of the Great Decade theory. In Genius: A Mosaic of One Hundred Exemplary
Creative Minds, Harold Blooms writes the following:
Everything that matters by Wordsworth was written in one decade, 1797-1807. The
last forty-three years of his poetry were lamentable. . . . Wordsworth’s genius burned
to the socket when he was thirty-seven. . . . But, with Wordsworth, the end was
implicit always in the origins of his genius: a visionary radiance fiercely resplendent
in his childhood, but then fading into the light of common day. If you invest
everything in the “romance of nature,” . . . then you will lose everything when nature
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eventually betrays the child who loved her. (377)
Although Bloom is often considered something of a critical apostate, the passage above is
strikingly representative of the dominant means of explaining (or failing to explain)
Wordsworth’s decline. Like most critics, he does not describe the downtrend as a process
but as the abrupt and premature absence, lack, or loss of poetic inspiration. The terminal
date of the bracketed decade is inscribed upon Wordsworth’s career as if it were his
epitaph: the great poet, the “genius” died in 1807; all written afterward was but a
posthumous echo. This description implicitly privileges a tropological model of
inspiration as afflatus—an impersonal force (wind, fire, or current) which acts upon the
poet’s imagination, stimulating creativity and poetic production. The poet, in such a
schema, is but the vessel that overflows or the lamp that burns: he is utterly subject to and
dependent upon a fount or flame external to himself, an intangible impetus to creativity
which can simply depart without warning or apparent cause, leaving him bereft and
“burned to the socket.” This latter phrase suggests another dimension of the mastermetaphor: the fire, both source and Promethean forge of vital verse, feeds upon and
consumes its bearer, whose capacity to sustain the flame diminishes as he ages. Youth is
therefore the fuel and necessary prerequisite for poetry which sustains a “visionary
radiance”; advanced age weakens the vessel, whose former resplendence dwindles to a
low, common light.
Initially, Bloom’s argument appears to be wholly dissimilar from other critics’
references to the Great Decade. However, the obvious discursive differences between this
and more “critical” approaches only conceal their common antecedents: Bloom’s heavily
figurative rationale merely unpacks the language of more austere formulae, divulging the
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full context of such terms as “originality,” “inspiration,” or “creativity” and magnifying
the metaphors of mind which, regardless of the critic’s intent, inhere in any discussion
which characterizes the loss of poetic capacity as a sudden and largely inexplicable
phenomenon.
But how is it possible that such ideas could enter into and inform critical
discourse without the critic’s knowledge? How could blatantly figurative concepts of
inspiration, creativity, and poetic production infiltrate a discipline so relentlessly attentive
to its own language and methods?
First, one must take into account the sheer difficulty of quantifying the operative
terms and processes. Both the production of poetry and the character of those
mental/artistic faculties which either enable or inhibit “inspired” composition constitute
irreducibly complex subjects. When confronting these issues, the critic is therefore more
likely to rely on ideas or tropes which convey the sense that poetic processes are
mysterious or ineffable (because this is indeed his or her impression). Second, one must
recognize that many critics have been more concerned with either the consequences of
the decline (how it actually affected the poetry) or the frame it offers for understanding
Wordsworth’s career (the myth as an enabling fiction) than with the process of decline
itself. Given these possibilities, some might argue that the perpetuation of metaphors of
mind is accidental.
Yet, “accident,” however construed, does not suffice to explain critics’
pronounced dependence upon tropological (and unelaborated) models of poetic process
as a means of explaining Wordsworth’s decline. The theory and the myth which is its
vehicle have been too static and too stubbornly persistent to be written off as merely
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collateral concerns. Instead, the perpetuation of the myth, and the dominant (albeit
inadequate) explanation of the process it describes, are direct consequences of the highly
problematic critical phenomenon first described by Jerome McGann in The Romantic
Ideology. “[T]he scholarship and criticism of Romanticism and its works,” he writes, “are
dominated by a Romantic ideology, by an uncritical absorption in Romanticism’s own
self-representations” (1). This absorption has occurred because “[w]hen forms of thought
enter our consciousness as forms (or ‘structures’) of feeling—which is what takes place
through poetry and art—the forms threaten to reify as ideology in the secondary
environment of criticism” (13).
McGann’s argument offers a solid explanation for most critics’ failure to move
beyond reductive rationale when explicating Wordsworth’s decline. Criticism has been
limited by a complex of internalized forms of thought and feeling—an ideology which,
given its perspective on creativity and the process of composition, resists “non-poetic”
descriptions of the poet’s work. The evidence of this complicity between Romantic
poetry and its criticism emerges most clearly in their shared lexicon. Once again,
Bloom’s brash statement discloses a process more subdued in other critical texts. For
example, when he claims Wordsworth’s “end was implicit always in the origins of his
genius,” Bloom defines those origins as “a visionary radiance fiercely resplendent in his
childhood, but then fading into the light of the common day”—a statement which
unabashedly appropriates the consummately Romantic imagery and diction of
Wordsworth’s own “Intimations” ode, which also laments the loss of a “radiance which
was so bright” and a “vision spending” as it “fade[s] into the light of common day”
(Longman 530.175, 73, 76).
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Of course, one cannot deny that Bloom has used this language with full
recognition of its source, just as one cannot deny the critic an abstract language in which
to couch discussions of such difficult concepts as “genius.” Yet the operative point is: If
we continually define Wordsworth in Wordsworth’s own terms, thus locating genius
outside of the poet and conceiving of it as an inspired quality possessed and not an actual
artistic capacity enacted, we will be led to assume that his ability to compose superior
poetry was only an intermittent brilliance which “burned to the socket” without warning
or concrete cause. However attractive such an assessment may be to those of us who
venerate individuals seemingly “electrocuted by the divine fire,” it ultimately becomes a
rationalization, a reductive premise that precludes understanding Wordsworth’s apparent
downtrend as a complex but explicable process.

Chapter 2
Autobiography and Poetic Self-Consciousness: The Causes and Costs of Revision
In an 1814 letter to Robert Pearce Gillies, Wordsworth offers his young admirer,
an aspiring poet, the following advice:
do you simply mean, that such thoughts as arise in the progress of composition should
be expressed in the first words that offer themselves, as being likely to be most
energetic and natural? If so, this is not a rule to be followed without cautious
exceptions. My first expressions I often find detestable; and it is frequently true of
second words as of second thoughts, that they are the best. (Wordsworth, Letters
3:179)
Despite the obvious contradiction between the principle expressed above and
Wordsworth’s now canonized “poetics of inspiration and spontaneity,” one is initially
inclined to accept this statement as a relatively commonplace, perfectly sound bit of
counsel (Bennett 12). Wordsworth’s experience had taught him what all writers
eventually realize: composition is a laborious, often recursive process, and one cannot
always rely upon first drafts or first words. Romantic myths of divinely-inspired poetic
composition, however attractive, are simply not practical in application; neither the
contemporary critic nor the Romantic poet would deny the necessity of “second
thoughts” and “second words.” Ultimately, revision is an essential part of composition—
so utterly common, in fact, that it seems a wholly unspectacular phenomenon.
Yet as critics have long recognized, Wordsworthian revision is anything but
typical. The sheer volume of his alterations, rewritings, and versions; the frequency with
which he applied himself to either editing or completely re-conceiving texts; the duration
of his efforts with individual poems, many of which would be constantly reworked over
the (considerable) span of his career—all are indications that, for Wordsworth, revision
served some purpose far beyond the simple refinement or “correction” of texts. In the
29
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introduction to his edition of Wordsworth’s collected works, Ernest de Selincourt writes
that “it is probable that no poet ever paid more meticulous or prolonged attention to his
text” (qtd. in Leader 651). His assessment, already grounded in decades of editorial
experience, has been borne out by subsequent efforts in textual scholarship. One need
only glance at the immensely detailed apparatus in any volume of the Cornell
Wordsworth to get a sense of the scope of the poet’s revisions. His manuscripts are
typically “disfigured with interlining, crossing out, and marginalia” (Gill, Wordsworth
191); they exist in multiple, usually contradictory versions; and substantial passages are
frequently either protean or peripatetic, lacking a set form or location. Further, the
complexity manifest in alterations to a single poem may be compounded by more holistic
revisions, as a text is either subsumed by or extracted from a longer work. In
Wordsworth’s corpus, virtually no poem has a fixed, stable identity. Change—perpetual
change—predominates.
Even more curious, however, is the manner in which Wordsworth revised, and the
effects of that process upon him. As Stephen Gill recounts in William Wordsworth: A
Life, for Wordsworth there was little or no distinction between the physical act of putting
a poem to paper and the introduction of further changes: “copying out and fresh
composition went on simultaneously,” as if the poet could not tolerate a “final” version,
even when the hand that copied (usually that of his sister, Dorothy, or wife, Mary) was
not his own (81). Further, the act of writing and the labor of revision also negatively
affected Wordsworth’s physical well-being, eliciting “a series of physical, psychosomatic
and psychological symptoms – including bad eyes, headaches, bowel complaints, chest
pains, irritability, fatigue, insomnia – ” which could be nearly debilitating (Bennett 3).

31
Such symptoms might be dismissed as the rather commonplace effects of excessive stress
or strain were it not for the strangely immediate relationship between illness and writing.
For example, in a letter to Thomas de Quincey, Wordsworth divulges that he has
a kind of derangement in my stomach and digestive organs which makes writing
painful to me, and indeed almost prevents me from holding correspondence with any
body: and this (I mean to say the unpleasant feelings which I have connected with the
act of holding a Pen) has been the chief cause of my long silence. (Wordsworth,
Letters 1:453)
This is neither an isolated observation nor an affected excuse for lapsed communication:
the correlation between writing and illness would be noted, repeatedly, by Dorothy and
others in close proximity to the poet.
While Wordsworth’s aversion to textual fixity doesn’t amount to a neurosis, his
demonstrable need to constantly revise does lend credence to the claims that the poet’s
attention to his texts was “obsessive” and that, for him, revision was nearly a
“compulsion.” All poets and all writers revise, but few have spent so much energy and
effort in the service of “second thoughts.” Consequently, Wordsworth’s tendency to
revision is one of the defining aspects of his poetic career, and the problems stemming
from that revisionary dynamic constitute some of the most productive and contentious
loci of critical discourse.
For these reasons, the question of how to read Wordsworth’s revisions and the
effort to understand the course and shape of his poetic career are inextricably intertwined.
One cannot read “Wordsworth”—either the poet or the poetry—without entering into and
engaging a complex network of discursive relationships: every reading represents a
choice between texts, and every text a potentially different vision (and version) of its
author. Though critics often remain silent concerning the problem of revision (an
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agnosticism which is sometimes necessary if one is to accomplish anything else), many
have chosen to confront the matter directly. The “Great Prelude Debate” is hardly an
isolated critical event, for the issues which crystallize therein have a discursive history
that extends both before and beyond that particular conversation.
For the sake of clarity, critical responses can be divided into two (admittedly
unwieldy and codependent) categories. First, there are the theoretical and ethical debates
elicited by both the practices and findings of textual scholarship. Initiated by de
Selincourt’s watershed parallel text edition of The Prelude, this body of criticism both
attempts to justify or rebuke editorial procedures and confronts what is at stake in those
procedures—including, most particularly, matters of textual authority. The principal
question here is: Which Wordsworth do we (or should we) read, and whose Wordsworth
is that anyway—the editor’s, the author’s, or some joint creation of the two? In this
species of criticism, Wordsworth’s revisions act primarily as an antagonistic catalyst for
debate and are treated as problematic phenomena, obstacles which must be either
negotiated or at least accounted for in the acts of reading and interpretation.
The second principal artery of discourse concerned with Wordsworth’s revisions
encompasses biographical, historical, or new historicist approaches. While issues of
textual authority are still at stake in such readings (and can often figure prominently in
analysis), the role and function of Wordsworth’s revisions shifts therein: they become
evidence—external signifiers of changes in the poet, his historical context, or the
ideological complexes informing either the poet or his product. Critics writing in this
category have frequently focused on such issues as the marked shift in Wordsworth’s
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political and religious opinions, the way his poems engage and incorporate history, or
shifts in modes of poetic self-representation.
Yet despite the vast breadth of approaches which have been brought to bear upon
Wordsworth’s revisions, one may still locate certain salient trends—themes, as it were,
which unify the critical corpus. Susan Wolfson accurately summarizes these themes in
the following:
In one long-standing tradition, revisions are read teleologically: they clarify an
original intent and refine its “final” expression, each stage conveying the discipline
and progress of a poet’s mind. This evolutionary model is not the only one however,
and The Prelude—perhaps more than any nineteenth-century text—poses a strong
resistance to it. For many there is a devolutionary tale: the revisions seem less to
signify improvement than a hardening sensibility, the story of decline, default, and
anticlimax that gets told about the career as a whole; correspondingly, earlier and
earliest versions gain praise for their vitality and fidelity to the best “Wordsworth.”
(Formal 101)
Obviously, Wolfson’s survey is a simplification: many degrees and shades of the above
perspectives have been entertained, and critics (like Wolfson herself) have often sought
to self-consciously interrogate the hermeneutics exercised in readings of Wordsworth.
Nevertheless, an overwhelming majority of interpretations align with one of the two
models. Textual scholars, depending on how they allocate editorial authority, tend to
fixate on either the “original” versions of poems or supposedly authorized, “final”
versions. Critics in the other mode are less explicit in their alignment, but the masternarratives are nonetheless active. For example, the common effort to track the changes in
Wordsworth’s politics—usually with an emphasis on the “revolutionary to conservative”
thesis, however construed—prototypically culminates in the defense of a particular
“Wordsworth.”
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These diametrically opposed readings represent yet another iteration of the
bifurcated image at the core of the mythico-critical construct of the “Great Decade.” Each
perspective may privilege and enshrine a different “Wordsworth,” but both depend upon
the same interpretive principle: binary division. Further, each reading is vulnerable to
“McGann’s razor”—that problematic complicity between Romantic ideology and
criticism consisting of “an uncritical absorption in Romanticism’s own selfrepresentations” (McGann 1). The “evolutionary model” is complicit because it
uncritically accepts Wordsworth’s own teleological schema of development (the “growth
and progress of a poet’s mind”), the “devolutionary tale” because it relies heavily on
Romantic tropes of inspiration, creativity, and imagination.
In place of the above static frame, I propose that one may understand the apparent
disparity between Wordsworth’s early and late poetry as a consequence of continuous
processes or career-long practices of revision. My goal is to erase the dichotomy between
the two Wordsworths by means of an interpretive model which can account for
difference, change, and even diminishment. Still, one might object that my argument
merely represents a different means of preserving the prototypical division between the
early and late Wordsworth(s): I support the basic aesthetic judgment underlying the
theory of decline, and doing so presumably risks reifying the same “doctrinal standard”
or “chronological reflex” embodied therein. The question thus becomes: How can one
retain the essential thesis of the Great Decade without falling victim to its tendency to
polarize the poet?4

4

As Lionel Trilling warns, “mechanical and simple notions of the mind, and of the poetic process are all
too tempting to those who speculate on Wordsworth’s decline” (qtd in Leader 658).
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The solution lies in how one chooses to address Wordsworth’s revisions or, more
accurately, the phenomenon of Wordsworthian revision. For what the aforementioned
categories of criticism have in common, however diverse their purposes, is not simply a
common frame of reference (the master-narratives of development or decline) but also a
particular methodology with respect to textual changes. From both perspectives, revisions
are objects or discrete phenomena—changes to be taken as either evidence of the status
of the text or proof of the influence external events (historical, social, or psychological)
have exercised upon Wordsworth’s poetry. Such approaches therefore fail to consider
how revision qua revision can at once provide the substance for analysis and serve as the
operative principle of that analysis. In other words, they fail to consider how dynamics of
reading and writing (for revision subsumes both) are not necessarily the manifest effects
of some external cause, but simultaneously causes, motives, or catalysts and effects
generated by the recursive movements of poetic production. This shortcoming may
therefore be remedied by carefully tracing those processes of reading and writing which,
in aggregate, provide a sufficiently accurate portrait of the poet’s consciousness.
Undoubtedly, any critical effort which features “consciousness” as an analytical
paradigm must proceed carefully: the term not only evokes what many consider an
outmoded style of criticism but also threatens to lapse into the same hermeneutic
circularity evinced by those former explanations of decline which interpreted Romantic
poetry according to Romanticism’s own epistemic or tropological models. However, this
potential theoretical pitfall may be avoided by adopting an appropriately rigorous method
of reading—an approach which maintains close attention to the text while also supplying
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an appropriate context for such arguably “formalist” methodology. One must operate both
within and without the text, reading on its terms while not becoming limited by them.
This approach is necessary for two reasons. First of all, either theoretical
extreme—a consummately formalist method on the one hand, a thoroughly new
historicist perspective on the other—becomes reductive in its reluctance to engage one
half of the available context. The former, upholding the aesthetic or “organic” unity of
the work, is limited to internal and ultimately subjective pronouncements concerning the
structure and content of the poem; the latter, in emphasizing cultural, historical, or
biographical factors, fails to consider that the poem itself—specifically, the act of writing
the poem—exercises an influence upon the poet. While either approach limits the
efficacy of interpretation, I find the latter especially dangerous because it provides a more
theoretically “current” (and thus tempting) critical approach even as it imposes another
restriction upon reading. Wordsworth’s poetry characteristically turns inward upon itself,
reflexively critiquing its own content and form. One should not exclude this aspect of the
text because it is representative of a “Romantic ideology” but evaluate how it reveals the
implicit tensions of the text and their role in that text’s formation.
My reading of Wordsworth is indebted to Susan Wolfson’s Formal Charges: The
Shaping of Poetry in British Romanticism. Therein, Wolfson employs a “contextualized
formalist criticism” which, while retaining New Criticism’s “commitment to close
reading and its care for poetic form,” seeks to avoid the insularity of that school by
engaging how “formal actions and choices” themselves “were enmeshed in networks of
social and historical conditions” (2, 4). I follow Wolfson in accepting that one may
“contextualize” formalist criticism but, instead of attending to “social and historical
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conditions,” my argument considers the context of poetic composition which arises when
one collates and compares the variant texts of Wordsworth’s poems. In other words, the
context of my own “formalism” becomes a network comprised of difference—a set of
intertextual relationships which emerges when one analyzes how the poem has been
altered, reshaped, and rewritten. This network is representative of both the poem’s and
poet’s (discursive) history, and may provide a useful (if often evasive) image of the
poet’s mind—a biography of a poetic consciousness in process.
Yet even a method predicated on process must establish a paradigm or point of
reference. Wordsworth did not revise for revision’s own sake; to suggest as such would
be to forward a rather reductive, mechanically psychoanalytic view of revision as an
involuted form of repetition compulsion. But if we instead consider what is at stake for
Wordsworth in each revision—what, precisely, is being modified through the acts of
rereading and rewriting—revision becomes not a groundless and self-indulgent exercise
but a value-laden attempt to articulate or realize a particular poetic goal. In the essay
“Wordsworth Revisited,” Geoffrey Hartman avers that in Wordsworth’s poetry, “a new
attitude toward consciousness—a radical consciousness of consciousness—is brought to
light: [he] is truly a subjective thinker” (9). This distinctive characteristic of
Wordsworth’s verse—its radical inwardness—is also indicative of its overriding purpose,
the poetic and discursive end which subsumes all others: the need for self-articulation—
or, in the words of Mary Jacobus, “the poet’s urgent need to constitute himself as poet”
(128).
The struggle to attain and articulate a stable poetic identity permeates
Wordsworth’s poetry. This is true not only of his lyrics, wherein the ever-present “I” is
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always the manifest subject, but of narrative works which, due to their efforts to assume
other voices (of pedlars, vagrants, or even children) might at first appear decidedly
impersonal. The evidence of this struggle toward self-definition lies in the poetry’s
manifest methodology: subjectivity is not only the subject but the site of composition;
memory, experience, and feeling are “read” through a versified phenomenology which
draws material from the mind only to turn the mind inward upon itself (its text) once
more. This movement is amplified and rendered explicit in the lyrics, where the “I” is not
only a ubiquitous lens but an active, reflective voice at once forming and interrogating its
own identity. Moreover, Wordsworth’s ever-present “I” is specifically textual—an entity
constructed within and by means of writing. As Andrew Bennett explains, “his topic is,
above all, the way in which the poet, the man, is composed by, composed in, poetic
composition, in writing” (6). Finally, we may deduce that the poetic identity represented
in Wordsworth’s poems is necessarily an idealized self—not only because the very
concept of a unitary, transcendental ego is open to question, but also because of the
supererogatory demands made upon that ego. Wordsworth’s poetic self was expected not
merely to speak but to constantly reaffirm the poet’s vocation, his qualifications and
capacities, his right to speak—meaning, to write—himself into being. In this light,
revision becomes not only a process of emending the text but an effort to amend, reshape,
reconstitute, and rewrite the self.
Wordsworth’s project of perpetual self-(re)definition is discernable, to some
extent, in all of his poetry. Even those poems which were not substantially altered (and
this includes only a handful) were a part of the process, for they would inevitably be
incorporated into the synchronic system of Wordsworth’s corpus—a system wherein the
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relationships between poems shaped (at least for the poet) the meaning of any individual
text. The result of any substantial textual revision was, then, a concomitant revision of
“Wordsworth,” of Wordsworth-as-Poet, of “Wordsworth-as-oeuvre: the Author as the
Mastertext to which every individual text . . . ultimately refers” (Siskin 109).
The origin and the epicenter of this panoptic process is undoubtedly The Prelude.
Tellingly subtitled “The Growth of the Poet’s Mind,”5 Wordsworth’s “great soliloquy”
constitutes his most sustained engagement with a single text, both in terms of fresh
composition and revision. It is at once a career-spanning and career-defining work, for it
not only preoccupied Wordsworth for almost the whole of his poetic career (from roughly
1798 to 1850) but literally was his career. Clifford Siskin’s comment that The Prelude is
“quite simply, the most extraordinary resume in English history” is only partially correct:
the poem is not only the secondary account or “curriculum vitae-like detailing” of “an
individual’s training and qualifications for performing his life’s work,” but the locus of
those processes of becoming—the poet’s poet-hood (identity) made manifest or, to adopt
an appropriately rhetorical characterization, the Poet’s synecdochic self (115).
But what kind of poem—or what kind of self—is The Prelude? In his
introduction to The Prelude: A Critical Casebook, Stephen Gill summarizes the
complicated circumstances surrounding the poem’s composition and publication as
follows:
The many-sided oddness of The Prelude still confronts all new readers who probe into
the poem at all and remains even now part of its essential being. And the oddness is?
At least the following facts about the identity of what is routinely—and rightly—
referred to as one of the greatest of Romantic poems: (1) that there is not one Prelude
but many; (2) that the poem known by this title evolved over many years during the
5

Of course, this subtitle was not given to the poem by Wordsworth but by his executors. However, there is
substantial evidence (within correspondence) to suggest that the poet himself referred to The Prelude as
such. Even if this were not the case, the poem amply validates the designation by means of its content.
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poet’s lifetime and has continued to evolve until practically the present day; and (3)
that the poem that student readers are most likely to encounter . . . was never
authorized by the poet, exists in no incontrovertibly established text, and was not even
known about until three-quarters of a century after the poet’s death and the appearance
of the poem he did authorize for publication. (Introduction 4)
Though often rehearsed, these facts are still startling. When Jonathan Arac declares that
“[w]e ourselves hardly have the concepts to disentangle so complex a knot of intention,
text, and history,” he is by no means exaggerating (36-37). Even if one ignores the
myriad editions of the poem, the reader confronting The Prelude can (currently) expect to
find at least three vastly different texts: the Two-Part Prelude of 1798; the 13 book
Prelude of 1805; and the fourteen book poem of 1850. Many critics also recognize two
additional versions: a “Five-Book Prelude” dating from approximately 1804 and an
1819-20 intermediate text of thirteen books.6 The complexity resulting from the sheer
number of potential reading texts is only compounded when one considers precisely how
different the respective versions are. As Zachary Leader explains,
From the time of the poem’s publication in 1850, three months after Wordsworth’s
death, from a manuscript “left ready for the Press by the Author,” to 1926, when de
Selincourt first made public, in a facing-text edition, the thirteen book version
Wordsworth completed in 1805, The Prelude was known in its authorized or 1850
version, the result of thirty-four years of painstaking but intermittent revision,
including three full-scale revisions (in 1816/19, 1832, and 1839) as well as numerous
smaller alterations. Ultimately, these revisions involved nearly half of the 1805
version’s 8000 or so lines. (667)
While it is helpful (and mostly accurate) to conceive of the poem in terms of those
dates and versions which presumably represented—temporarily at least—what the poet
considered a “completed” text, Leader’s “numerous smaller alterations” is a decided
understatement: most evidence indicates that Wordsworth returned to the poem quite
frequently between these watershed revisions. Thus, the concept of a “finished” version
6

Compiled and edited by Duncan Wu and Mark Reed, respectively.
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of The Prelude is by necessity a critical fiction. As Gill records when writing of the 1805
Prelude, “There is no single, unimpeachable text of this version, as Wordsworth
subjected it to revision even as the manuscripts were being made” (Introduction 17).
The disagreement between Gill and Leader evident in the preceding quotations
(concerning the existence of an “authorized” text) points to another dimension of the
“problems” surrounding The Prelude: namely, that almost every aspect of its
composition, publication, and subsequent editing has been (and still is) subject to heated
critical debate. Indeed, “The Great Prelude Debate,” despite its considerable scope,
addresses only a portion of the contested issues. As a result, The Prelude was not and will
never be a “unified, discrete, finished, stable textual object” (Wolfson, “Revision” 101);
it is a radically unstable text, a poem perpetually in flux.
Yet this is not the only instability characteristic of The Prelude. In addition to the
pronounced differences between “versions,” one encounters in any given reading text an
internal dialectic of competing ideas, images, and discourses.7 In her “‘Answering
Questions and Questioning Answers’: The Interrogative Project of The Prelude,” Susan
Wolfson draws upon the philosophy of Hans-Georg Gadamer and the reader-response
theories of Hans Robert Jauss to argue that The Prelude is “self-evidently a poem in the
interrogative mode” which “despite its designs of resolution . . . habitually leaves its most
critical questions unanswered, or answered with something less than full conviction and
simplicity” (128). Further, she claims, the poem constantly critiques those propositions
which it does permit to emerge: “Passages [will] rarely inscribe a conceptual pattern
without destabilizing its authority—sometimes soon after, sometimes nearly
7

Because the 1799 “Two-Part Prelude,” is more internally consistent than the later, much longer versions
of the poem, it represents a possible exception to this rule. Yet even in this early version—wherein the
poetry is “all of a piece” (Wordsworth 570)—The Prelude contains conflicting discursive forces.
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simultaneously” (131). Ultimately, this “dialogics of question and answer” creates a
“destructive circularity” that precludes the possibility of any singular or stable
(monologic) meaning (142, 152): the poem is inherently heteroglossic, sustaining “A
tempest, a redundant energy, / vexing its own creation” (1805 I.46-7). In a much different
context, William Galperin provides an apt description of the poem’s internal instability:
The Prelude is “the autobiography that immediately deconstructed the very self it
promoted” (166).
Any proposition about the poetic self which emerges from or within The Prelude
is thus subject to compounded torsion. Outside of the text, Wordsworth-writing impinges
upon the stability of the poetic line, altering the poem and thus altering the character of
the poet portrayed therein; within the text, Wordsworth’s (lyric) “I” (in its perpetual
present) questions, contests, and often dismantles the “props of [its own] affections,” at
once testing identities and making any singular, logically consistent self impossible. This
doubly-comprised semantic indeterminacy is further augmented by the indeterminacy of
the poem’s form—a generic frame which might otherwise provide some ground (via
convention) for stable signification. Leon Waldoff explains this phenomenon as follows:
The form of The Prelude is perhaps the most mixed of all Wordsworth’s poems, being
at once autobiography, epic, elegy, verse epistle, romance, pastoral, and, of course,
lyric, that most protean and versatile of forms. His reliance on more than one form—
or, to be more accurate, more than one tradition of poetic forms—in each of the major
lyrics and The Prelude suggests that it takes more than one poetic tradition to
represent the subjectivity of the speaker in each work. Wordsworth adopts a form such
as the ode or elegy or the epic, but he appropriates from various poetic traditions
whenever is necessary, within certain generic and formal limits, to enable the “I” in its
act of self-representation in each work to achieve its expressivist, constitutive, and
self-transformative aims. (153)
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While Waldoff provides a viable rationale for the formal heterogeneity of The Prelude,8
his explanation also grants Wordsworth’s “expressivist, constitutive, and selftransformative aims” too much constancy. The poet’s aims, though multiple and not
necessarily compatible with each other, are presumed to be more or less stable. As such,
Waldoff assumes that the self or subjectivity Wordsworth wishes to represent maintains a
more or less constant (potential or desired) identity over time. Granted, Waldoff is careful
to circumscribe the source of that discursive self as follows:
In the case of the major lyrics and The Prelude, the person whose feelings
Wordsworth describes, identifies with, and conjures up the feelings of is less the
empirical Wordsworth that he wanted his readers to think of when he used the phrase
“the poet in his own person” than the imaginatively reconstituted self he prefers to
remember or tries to become. (155)
But even the idea of an “imaginatively reconstituted self” (idealized “I” or Poet) implies a
degree of conceptual integrity—in this case, a semi-platonic “I” who is ever being sought
beyond the bounds of the cave. The desired self may be a “dramatized, transitional self,”
but the hint of transcendental unity remains: the idealized “I” is granted partial immunity
to the instabilities permeating the text, a “special mode of being” which protects the (idea
of the) Poet from any obstinate questionings (29).
That said, Waldoff’s observations on The Prelude’s heterogeneous form still have
merit; his discussion simply needs to be reoriented. Consider the identity between two
forms of self-definition in the poem: self-definition as the poem’s effort to articulate its
own consummately idiosyncratic formal character; and self-definition as the realization
of poetic identity, or the creation of “character” by means of form. In other words, there
is no separation between the poem’s means and its ends; therein, poetic forms or
8

This is especially true of his description of the manner in which Wordsworth pragmatically “adopts”
different forms/traditions for the purpose of self-representation, though I would suggest “appropriates” is a
more accurate word.
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traditions are not mustered toward representational aims so much as a consciousness is
created of and structured by form. There is no “first” or “prior” term in this equation:
consciousness is form and form consciousness. The Poet is the poem—both created by
and through one another.
The quasi-Heideggerian circularity of these terms suggests a very pragmatic
point: The Prelude, by virtue of its subject, form, and style, is as much creating the poet
as it is being created by him. One could draw useful distinctions between the empirical
Wordsworth (self-as-lived), Wordsworth-writing ((sense of) self-as-poet), and
Wordsworth-as-Poet (the lyrical “I” or self-as-imagined); but regardless of how
thoroughly one discriminates between “real” and “fictive” selves, the fact remains that
both realms influence and shape one another. A poet’s self-image may well be a fictional
construct, but it has very real ramifications. Wordsworth was shaped by The Prelude’s
“Wordsworth” just as surely as a reader’s understanding of the poet is conditioned by the
poem—and, as will be seen, by precisely the same means.
At this point, we have tentatively established the following:
1) The Prelude is not simply an individual poem by Wordsworth but, as a
“mastertext” of poetic identity (the central preoccupation of the poet’s
career), the functional center of the Wordsworthian corpus.
2) The Prelude is a radically unstable text in material, semantic, and formal
registers.
3) The Prelude and Wordsworth’s poetic self—what Andrew Bennett calls,
evocatively, “the figure of a poet, the self-figuring poet” (10)—are
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essentially one and the same. The poem which claims to track “The
Growth of the Poet’s Mind” shapes the very growth it wishes to describe.
Given these suppositions, one can establish a motive principle for subsequent analysis:
The efforts toward self-definition and the articulation of poetic identity manifest in The
Prelude are not exclusive to or confined within the boundaries of that poem but reach
outward toward the whole of the Wordsworthian corpus. This is a direct consequence of
a) The Prelude’s explicit subject (the poet’s mind), which leads to the creation of an idea
of a poetic identity or self-image that structures and informs other poetic production; and
b) its plural, palimpsestuous text(s), which both indirectly and directly interact with other
poetic texts—interpenetrating, shaping, and often wholly subsuming subsidiary verse. An
analysis which seeks to understand the shape of the poet’s career may therefore begin
within or, more accurately, across the Prelude(s), and derive thereof a method for reading
the figure of the Poet as it develops over time.
When time (development, change, or potential discontinuity) becomes a
consideration, Wordsworth’s revisionary practices—as well as the content of the
revisions themselves (whether consisting of addition or deletion)—come to the fore. This
is equally true of narrative time and real time: the lyric “I” questions and reorients itself
as the poem proceeds through discursive time; Wordsworth the editor, the revisionist, and
the reader questions and alters his text(s) over the course of his life. To a great extent,
one can accurately define both these movements as types of revision: the first, as an
internal revision of understanding; and the second, as an explicit and external revision of
texts. However, the crucial realization is that the second process—whereby Wordsworth
actually shapes the text and therefore the self—wholly determines the first. By becoming

46
the (re-)writer of himself, Wordsworth can direct the course of that textual self’s
becoming. With any act or instance of revision, Wordsworth-writing can impose or
exercise a palpable design upon his poetic self.
In his landmark study Wordsworth’s Poetry: 1787-1814, Geoffrey Hartman
provides an apt characterization of The Prelude’s place in Wordsworth’s corpus and, by
extension, a means for understanding the effects of Wordsworth’s revisionary practices:
And, by a curious irony, the unpublished Prelude, which is his greatest testimony to
the living mind, now discourages further self-exploration. . . . [L]ater sentiments . . .
do not rely, in their weakness, on the external authority of the church, but on the
internal authority of his own greatest poem, which is kept private, and as scripture to
himself abets the flat reiteration of his ideas in a slew of minor poems. (330)
Putting aside—for now—the aesthetic judgment(s) intimated here, the crucial idea is
rather that of The Prelude as Wordsworth’s “scripture to himself.”
Hartman’s metaphor is ample. The comparison of The Prelude to scripture both
draws upon and draws out an immense chain of associations between the poem and
biblical language, motifs, paradigms, and structural devices.9 However, the most
important consideration is not the direct correspondences between biblical and poetic
texts but the semantic character of the vehicle itself: Scripture is law, commandment, and
Word; it claims to speak with the voice of God and thus with absolute authority over all
creation. If one transposes this essence and function to the text of The Prelude, the poem
figures not simply as a center but as an all-encompassing wholeness—the ur-text of all
poetic creation. Due to the paradoxical internalization of the Word and its unequivocal
authority, and given that Wordsworth literally writes himself (the poet, a textual creation)
into being, this scripture is strangely contingent upon the will of the subject(ivity) it seeks

9

Indeed, the biblical resonances are doubly profuse; Wordsworth is also appropriating Milton, whose epic
colludes with—or is almost tantamount to—scripture.
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to command. Granted, contingency haunts both forms of scripture: the ultimate
“meaning” of the Word always depends on how and by whom it is interpreted. Yet, in the
case of The Prelude, scripture can literally and physically be rewritten.
Hartman’s metaphor provokes several important questions. For example, what
problems emerge when he who wields the Word is subject to and determined by the
boundaries and limitations of rhetoric? What effect do these boundaries and limitations
have upon the thinking, writing subject? And what is the ultimate product of that process,
in terms of its impact upon both poem and poet?
If the poem is created by the poet, and the Poet created by the poem, we can only
know one through the rhetoric of the other. Therefore the question of revision must be
addressed by way of an understanding of poetic form—the frames of interpretation,
understanding, and representation which constitute and structure The Prelude and, by
extension, the whole of Wordsworth’s poetry. Despite McGann’s assertions, this does not
necessarily constitute a problematic complicity between criticism and a “Romantic
ideology.” Wolfson demonstrates as such with her forceful reply to McGann’s critique:
“Some [Romantic] poems do turn from social conflict, or use their forms to exile and
displace disruptive knowledge; but other poems, far from concealing the problematic of
form, provoke it anew, as a condition of their very composition” (15). Form in many
Romantic poems necessarily functions as a critique of its own premises, opening them up
to question: “designs of unity in . . . [many] Romantic poems reflect on rather than
conceal their constructedness” (14; emphasis added).
Undoubtedly, The Prelude is the most reflective and inward-turning of the
canonical works Wolfson references. As such, one can locate these moments of critique
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and reflection in its text(s), and subsequently use the revealed problematic[s] of form as a
means of approaching the much larger problem of Wordsworth’s poetic decline. In the
following, three key passages will open The Prelude to the problems which will
preoccupy the remainder of this study.
We turn first to the “two consciousnesses” passage, found originally in the second
part of the “Two-Part Prelude” and occupying an analogous position in the 1805 and
1850 texts:
A tranquilizing spirit presses now
Upon my corporeal frame, so wide appears
The vacancy between me and those days,
Which yet have such self-presence in my heart
That sometimes when I think of them I seem
Two consciousnesses—conscious of myself,
And of some other being. (1799 2.25-31)
This passage remains intact and relatively unchanged in all versions of The Prelude—a
fact which, considering the radical instability of the poem, is highly significant. Through
frequent (re)reading(s), critics have also made it something of a touchstone for analysis,
adopting the rather useful figure of a radically divided self to illustrate various textual
tensions and conflicts. Most commonly, though, it is taken to be a figure which addresses
the ineluctable remove between a past and a present self and thus an illustration of a
problematic mechanism central to most Wordsworth poems: memory. This interpretation
finds abundant support in the passage, wherein Wordsworth’s lines move between a
present, active, self-conscious “I” and a static, stable Other; or, in Wolfson’s words, “a
speaking subject (‘me’) and textual object (‘those days’ of ‘some other being’)”
(“Answering” 146). It is important to note that the two strongest verbs in the passage—
“presses” and “think”—belong, respectively, to the “tranquilizing spirit” and the speaking
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subject, both of which (though by no means equivalent) are essentially figures for the
active mind. In the Norton edition of The Prelude, the editors further emphasize the role
of mind, pointing out that the “corporeal frame” of these lines represents a “recollection
of Tintern Abbey 44-46” wherein “the corporeality of the body is stressed to show the
dominance of mind” (15, n.4). The speaking subject’s status as a conscious, reflexive self
only serves to emphasize the width of the “vacancy” between present and past selves:
“those days” have a “self-presence”—i.e., a nearly independent, tangible existence—in
the speaker’s mind; he is studying them as he would unfamiliar phenomena because their
distance in time makes them strange.
Yet the speaker’s “estrangement by vacancy” from his other, former self is not
only a cognitive dilemma (Wolfson, “Answering” 146); it is a predicament of reading and
writing. After all, the speaker is not simply thinking about “those days” but writing about
them, and his study of those self-presences is fundamentally an act of reading the
remembered past. For this reason, the aforementioned division of mind and body is
analogous to the division between the self-writing and the corporealized text of the past, a
text which has become Other—separate, distinct, and temporally immobile. From here, it
is no great leap to move, as many critics have, to a consideration of the passage as
expressive of a formal dilemma which haunts and permeates the whole of The Prelude:
the problem of autobiography.
Wordsworth’s effort to read his past evokes an ineluctable “gap” or inadequacy
inherent to all autobiography—an epistemic predicament Anne Mellor describes as “the
uncertain relation between the self-as-lived and the self-as-imagined, between the
referential and the written self, the gap or vacancy between ‘two consciousnesses’” (300).
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Given this vacancy, she argues, the closure or unity of the self (and thus the text, which is
presumed to be equivalent) becomes a virtual impossibility; the gap can only be bridged
by the fiction of a “transcendental ego” or “unitary self that is maintained over time by
the activity of memory” (293).
But this fiction is a tenuous remedy at best, and the passage’s insistence on binary
division—on the presence of two consciousnesses—belies the poet’s insistence (note the
emphatic “such self-presence”) that he can span the vacancy between selves by means of
(re)reading the past. Wordsworth attempts to encompass present and past by means of the
unitary “I,” but ultimately the “other being” gets the literal last word. In essence, the
problem is that the past is not the corporealized, stable, legible text he wishes it to be; the
vacancy is too wide, and his vision inadequate to the task. The poet is sufficiently
reflexive or self-critical to openly acknowledge the autobiographical predicament but
tries to subvert it nevertheless. Yet his effort ultimately fails, for the two consciousnesses
remain, and remain separate and discrete. As Wolfson indicates, it is important that the
only alteration to the passage in later versions of The Prelude is to change “heart” to
“mind,” “as if to concede the cognitive dilemma against the emotional faith in one’s life
as a coherent and legible text” (“Answering” 147).
By recognizing the problem of “two consciousnesses”—the fundamental problem
of autobiography—The Prelude attempts to negotiate and circumvent (if not eliminate)
the epistemic “vacancy” between present and past. The order of the latter terms is
important: memory must always function in retrospect, moving from the I’s now to the
Other’s then via the power of recollection; it cannot, strictly speaking, construct the past
from the ground up but must reverse-engineer a history via narrative. Aware of this
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problematic mechanism, Wordsworth’s poem once again reflects upon a “cognitive
dilemma” which informs its construction, attempting to subvert (or sublimate) the
problem by subsumption:
Of these and other kindred notices
I cannot say what portion is in truth
The naked recollection of that time,
And what may rather have been called to life
By after-meditation. . . . (1805 3.644-48)
Here, Wordsworth essentially concedes that memory is a creative process: a “portion” of
the experience, event, or object might have been “called to life / By after-meditation”—
literally given life (“called”) by the poet’s Word. It is worth mentioning that this
formulation appears to conform to one of Wordsworth’s most famous poetic maxims: that
“Poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings: it takes its origin from emotion
recollected in tranquility” (Prose 1:148.387-88). On the surface, then, Wordsworth
appears to acknowledge and accept that the act of recall is inherently a creative—and thus
technically “inaccurate”—process. Nevertheless, there is an implicit tension in these
lines. The words in the phrase “naked recollection,” rather than cooperatively signifying
“the truth and only the truth,” actually grate against one another: for against the starkness
of “naked,” to “recollect” implies at once a fragmentary and piecemeal procedure and a
process that is repeated or secondary. And as the act of recall is an act of reading a past
self, the poem once again confronts a dilemma endemic to autobiographical discourse.
The poet’s meta-awareness of the quandaries inherent to the autobiographical
form does not apply exclusively to reading: autobiography is not simply recollection but
representation; it is reading and writing. In this way, the preceding passage reveals what
Wolfson calls “the poem’s larger questions about retrospective self-reading” (Formal
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110). Quoting Jonathan Culler, she phrases the question thus: “to what degree are the
events ‘determined by various narrative and discursive requirements?’” (qtd. in Formal
110). Paul de Man provides an unusually straightforward answer: Completely.
We assume that life produces autobiography as an act produces its consequences, but
can we not suggest, with equal justice, that the autobiographical project may itself
produce and determine the life and that whatever the writer does is in fact governed by
the technical demands of self-portraiture and thus determined, in all its aspects, by the
resources of his medium? (“Autobiography” 69)
Although de Man phrases his answer (judiciously) as a question, the disproportionate
weight of the sentence’s second half suggests what further consideration of de Man’s
premises will confirm: that he conceives of autobiography as a form inextricably bound
up in its own constructedness.
But for de Man, to refer to autobiography as a “form” at all is an equivocation.
Later in his essay, we find the following (re)definition of the term:
Autobiography, then, is not a genre or a mode, but a figure of reading or of
understanding that occurs, to some degree, in all texts. The autobiographical moment
happens as an alignment between the two subjects involved in the process of reading
in which they determine each other by mutual reflexive substitution. (70)
Given the predominance of reading and the equivocal identity of “the reader” (who can
be at once the poet or the poet’s audience), de Man’s mention of “two subjects” has the
potential to mislead. Here, Jon Cook’s explication of “Autobiography as De-Facement” is
helpful:
The argument is that the sense of an identity, a subject, or a life produced by
autobiography is a rhetorical effect. The rhetorical figure which creates autobiography
is in the ‘alignment between the two subjects’, the one who writes, and the one who is
written about, each determining the other in an endless and unresolvable play of
difference and identity. . . . The rhetorical structure of autobiography divides the self
in the act of composing it. (51)
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Thus explicated, de Man’s formulation is clearly evocative of the “two consciousnesses”
passage: the moment of reading—i.e., the moment of Wordsworth’s reading his past
(which is the “auto-biographical moment”)—results in the division of the poet into “I”
and “some other being.” According to de Man, Wordsworth’s attempts to bridge the
vacancy between these consciousnesses cannot possibly succeed: it is within language
and therefore subject to the limitations of rhetoric, wherein “the non-coincidence of sign
and meaning” precludes any possibility of an alignment between signifier and signified
(Cook 37). In other words, both of Wordsworth’s consciousnesses cease to refer to any
empirical reality or self at the moment when they are written into the text: language is
rhetoric and rhetoric does not mean, it figures, replacing any real referent with an
arbitrary and intrinsically meaningless sign. As a result, the relationship between
Wordsworth’s two consciousnesses can never be resolved. Because neither figure has a
discrete referent, they determine or depend upon one another, signifying only by means
of “an endless and unresolvable play of difference and identity.”10
De Man’s autobiographical moment “happens as an alignment of two subjects
involved in the process of reading in which they determine each other by mutual reflexive
substitution” (70). This moment, comparable to the alignment (and separation of) “two
consciousnesses,” creates a concomitant meta-textual moment: “The specular moment
10

In my estimation, the inherent negativity of de Man’s theory of language renders it untenable.
Regardless of how rigorously one argues for the complete divorce of sign from referent, the fact remains
that there was an actual, material man named Wordsworth who composed The Prelude. Thus, I am not
arguing from the perspective of deconstruction or of Paul de Man: I take issue with the indispensable axiom
of his theory—namely, that language cannot possibly signify, mean, or refer to anything.
That said, de Man’s theory of autobiography and the deconstructive modes of reading evinced
therein are particularly effective and useful analytic tools in the context of my argument. This is true for
two reasons: First, by focusing my analysis on Wordsworth-as-poet, and by attempting to track the
consequences of revision within that textual system, I am adopting a rather Derridean maxim: nothing is
outside of the text—especially not the “poet.” And second, because de Man’s theory of autobiography is
predicated on the endless play of figuration, reading, and writing—an approach which emphasizes those
discursive acts central to the process of revision and the compositional problems inherent therein.
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that is part of all understanding reveals the tropological structure that underlies all
cognitions, including knowledge of the self” (71). As Cook explains,
Doubleness and division creates what de Man describes as ‘a specular structure’
(1984: 70): autobiography is the equivalent of a mirror, but a mirror in which it
becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish between reflection and reality. The writer
looks back or looks at him- or herself in pursuit of finding or knowing a self. But this
self is composed in writing. According to de Man, autobiographical writing turns
around this moment. It is tropological, in a way that recalls the root meaning of ‘trope’
in the Greek word for ‘turn’. To read autobiography is to be caught up in this turning
of the self and of language. (51)
The “specular structure”—a structure of seeing or, more appropriately, reading—enables
self-awareness and reflection; but the insight gained is not “self-knowledge.” Instead, it is
an awareness of the “tropological structure” or constructedness of autobiography, and
thus an awareness of the contingency (i.e., written-ness) of the text. The fact that the self
observed is a self that has been “composed” proves an ineluctable impediment to
unclouded sight and coherent reading: one subject cannot “read” the other because
language does not signify, but tropes, thereby turning away from meaning and
substituting a figure.
Curiously enough (or perhaps purposefully), de Man does not address the passage
of The Prelude which most clearly evinces a specular structure. That passage, another
oft-analyzed sequence, reads as follows:
As one who hangs down-bending from the side
Of a slow-moving boat upon the breast
Of a still water, solacing himself
With such discoveries as his eye can make
Beneath him in the bottom of the deeps,
Sees many beauteous sights—weeds, fishes, flowers,
Grots, pebbles, roots of trees—and fancies more,
Yet often is perplexed, and cannot part
The shadow from the substance, rocks and sky,
Mountains and clouds, from that which is indeed
The region, and the things which there abide
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In their true dwelling; now is crossed by gleam
Of his own image, by a sunbeam now,
And motions that are sent he knows not whence,
Impediments that make his task more sweet;
Such pleasant office have we long pursued
Incumbent o’er the surface of past time—
With like success. (1805 4: 247-64)
To borrow from Wolfson, “[t]his is the epic simile . . . launched to image the perplexed
epistemology of writing and reading autobiography” (Formal 128). The essential
dynamics of the image are fairly uncomplicated: a man in a boat leans lazily over the side
to gaze into the water. However, the optical dynamic of the passage (its “specular
structure”) is complex and layered: the poet (object of the simile) first sees the bottom of
the “still water,” which is populated with “weeds, fishes, flowers, / Grots, pebbles, roots
of trees”; then he is “perplexed” by the surface of the water, which is reflecting “rocks
and sky, / Mountains and clouds” and thus impeding his vision of the bottom; next, he
sees in the water’s surface his own image, which crosses the former reflections; and
finally, he is similarly “crossed” by a sunbeam and “motions that are sent he knows not
whence.” If we begin by reading the simile literally, the passage may be said to move
from “deeps” to surface to sky, pulling the observed object(s) or phenomena closer to the
eye until they or their causes pass beyond visibility. However, it is even more crucial to
note that each successive “level” of seeing impedes or obscures the former: “looking
through” and seeing clearly is not an option after the eye is “perplexed” and then
“crossed” because the layers interpenetrate, mix, and confound one another.
As Cook rightly observes, the analogical mechanism of the simile is to “transform
temporal into spatial relations” (33): the poet is “Incumbent o’er the surface of past
time,” and his vision moves from the depths (long ago) to the surface (the present) to the
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unobservable (future) in an anti-regressive movement. Yet as vision is impeded by each
successive level of time, the poet must attempt to “look through” and does so with
decreasing efficacy. What we have, then, is a double movement: a movement up from the
bottom which proceeds by means of the simile’s narrative, and an attempted movement
down into the depths, which follows the poet’s field or range of vision. As he attempts to
penetrate beneath the surface of past time, time moves up toward and beyond the present,
progressively clouding and finally thwarting his vision altogether. Importantly, the two
movements first “cross” when the poet sees a “gleam / Of his own image.” At this point,
the depths become completely illegible.
The analogical identities of levels and objects are easily identified: for example,
the “weeds, fishes, flowers, / Grots, pebbles, roots of trees” in the depths are distant,
discrete, natural objects which evoke Wordsworth’s ubiquitous vision of childhood and
of the poet as a child, when he was yet Nature’s “favored being.” But the most resonant
dynamic or moment of the passage arrives with that moment of self-recognition or (self)reflection—the moment wherein the poet can see nothing but the image of himself
looking back at him.
Clearly, this is a moment of (visual) recognition equivalent to what de Man called
“the alignment of two subjects”: one movement—time—has brought the poet’s present
self to the surface, where the poet-seeing observes not himself but the image, figure, or
reflection of himself—a simulacrum. If these terms are transposed to the arena of texts
and of reading and writing (which they never really left), the simulacrum of the poet
becomes the figure-of-the-poet, a self written into being. It is this written self, the lyric
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“I,” which ultimately obscures the poet’s vision, preventing him from seeing his own past
clearly.
The passage thus constitutes a poeticized model of the processes of reading that
both define and limit autobiographical discourse. The reflection, representative of
Wordsworth’s present self, obscures the successive layers and depths of “past time,”
which constitute an aggregate of former selves stretching back into childhood. As such,
the poet’s present self filters, shapes, constructs, and determines how he reads former
selves. The poet’s newly realized identity never really attains a stable state because it is
quickly crossed and superseded by the upward thrust of time. Furthermore, that
ephemeral “I” is necessarily a distorted or remade self—one comprised of the past but
filtered through the demands and expedients of the narrative moment.
The “figure of reading” evident in this passage is also directly applicable to
Wordsworth’s processes of revision (de Man 70). Every time the poet revisited and
reread his text(s), he effectively added another layer of interpretation, another (re)figuring
of poetic identity to the existing aggregate of selves/texts. Wordsworth’s revisions to The
Prelude thus accumulate like sediment—at once adding new material to the whole and
changing the shape of the previous text, now further within the deeps. This is not an
inherently negative process: the change between the 1799 and 1805 Preludes, for
example, creates an entirely new, much different poem. Nor is it uniform: portions of The
Prelude are relatively stable throughout all versions. It is, however, a process which
yields perpetual change in the name of realizing a present poetic self (“I”) which is everreceding into the past. By the time The Prelude is in its “final,” 1850 incarnation, the
poem has been subject to such substantial and continuous revision that “there are
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frequent outcrops of several earlier formations, forming an almost geologic cross-section
of earlier authorial selves” (Wood 8).
Ultimately, autobiographical self-representation and revision are equivalent.
Indeed, Wordsworth’s efforts to write autobiography, to reflect upon and “revise his selfunderstanding” are inherently bound to more explicit revisionary processes (Hartman,
“Introduction” xxv). Because Wordsworth’s poetic identity is realized through the text,
he cannot update or amend the former without altering the latter. What’s more, the poet
in the process of writing autobiography must remember, interpret, and incorporate a
history which is comprised of texts and readings of texts. Wolfson explains this
phenomenon as follows:
As poetic activity recollects, reviews, interprets, and reinterprets its phantoms of
conceit, poetic composition produces revision as the enactment as well as the report of
these processes. Scanning the surfaces and depths of time past, the “considerate and
laborious work” of writing returns Wordsworth to manuscripts past, to reperuse the
surfaces and gaps of their texts. Manuscripts as well as memories constitute his past,
and textual revision reduplicates, perpetuates, and enters into recollection. In this
involute, revision is not just compositional; it is the very trope of autobiography. . . .
(Formal 104)
If revision is the rhetorical mechanism of autobiography, then it follows that the
problematics of form inherent in autobiographical writing are applicable to processes of
revision. The preceding conclusions may therefore be applied directly to the text of
Wordsworth’s Prelude(s) as rubrics or frames for further analysis. By addressing how
time, constructedness, memory, and the limitations of rhetoric inform the relationship
between versions of The Prelude, one can determine the ultimate impact and import of
Wordsworth’s revisionary practices.
Yet even these conclusions are insufficient to support the contention that
Wordsworth’s revisions were both the central cause and overt manifestation of his poetic
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decline. However deeply the problematics of (autobiographical) form inform the shaping
of poetic texts, they still do not implicitly explain how revision can compromise the
quality of poetic production. In order to substantiate the link between revision and
decline, one needs a means of demonstrating how revisionary practices can compromise
or attenuate a poetic text.
Nigel Wood’s discussion of retrospection and reordering in The Prelude provides
a solid base for precisely such an effort. The relevant passages read as follows:
Retrospection reorders the events that contribute to the present ‘self’. . . The Prelude
represents, therefore, a proposition about the past that emerges from this anxiety to
construct it in the present. . . .‘Anxiety’ is an apt word for this reordering, as it
involves a working through of the displaced fears and repressed desires, a full coming
to terms (in a quite literal sense) with these shadows of authority or Otherness that
cannot be faced directly, either because they only now exist in a language that is
metaphorical (and so require extensive interpretation) or because they need to be
reassembled out of their chronological order in order that they can emerge for the
conscious mind. (21)
One of the fundamental problems at work in autobiography is the inevitable
constructedness of the life written therein—a life which is effectively “reordered” to suit
the discursive or formal demands of narrative. When further figured as an act of reading,
and as a revisionary act of reading which must, by necessity, be contingent upon the
poet’s present, the effort to compose or write oneself becomes identical to what Wood
calls the “proposition about the past which emerges from this anxiety to construct it in the
present.” The following chapter will explain how the concept of “anxiety,” adapted to
autobiographical discourse, aptly characterizes the process that shapes and impels
Wordsworth’s revisionary practices.

Chapter 3: Anxiety and Autobiography
While anxiety is indeed an “apt word” for the agonistic process(es) or energies
which conditioned the Prelude’s (re-)composition, it is also an incredibly ambiguous one.
Even Nigel Wood’s formulation, which stolidly (and accurately) characterizes
Wordsworth’s anxiety as a process of “reordering,” threatens to become nebulous due to
the profuse connotations the word has accrued in post-Freudian discourse (Introduction
21). On the other hand, reductive definitions and an over-rigorous circumscription of
meaning would inevitably collapse at the hands of the dynamic “working through” which
at once constitutes and results from (an) anxiety. Ultimately, what one needs is an
inclusive and flexible concept which may be located without becoming fixed; it is not
necessary to know what anxiety “is” so long as one knows where and when it occurs.
According to Wood, Wordsworth’s anxiety was a discursive phenomenon which
concomitantly subsumed and motivated a complex of psychological, temporal, and
hermeneutic processes. However, Wood gives insufficient emphasis to what truly binds
these processes—namely, their coincidence in what de Man calls the autobiographical or
specular moment. As adduced in the previous chapter, this autobiographical moment
“happens as an alignment between the two subjects involved in the process of reading in
which they determine one another by mutual reflexive substitution” (de Man
“Autobiography” 70). Further, the alignment between the one who writes and the one
who is written about is specular because it represents a moment of vision or insight that
“reveals the tropological structure which underlies all cognitions, including knowledge of
the self” (72). Autobiographical discourse always bifurcates the writing subject, creating
a spatiotemporal difference which thwarts full representation. But in the very act of
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dividing the self, writing also makes possible a moment of reading wherein the self-whowrites recognizes that the self-written-about is a rhetorical effect. The net result of this
process is to make the poet see himself in the act of composing a self; he becomes aware
of “his” constructedness. This “tropology of the subject” is poetic self-awareness or selfconsciousness.
Anxiety happens in and at this moment of poetic self-consciousness. It is a
turning-inward which enables awareness yet frustrates closure. This is not the more
familiar, more tangible type of anxiety (which is a felt anxiety, or anxiety as a
psychological and physiological state), though such considerations are certainly
relevant.11 Instead, this anxiety is explicitly linked to reading and writing autobiography:
its character is distinctly discursive, for it arises from, is motivated by, and results in
poetic production.
For de Man, all writing is inherently autobiographical. His treatment of
Wordsworth and the Prelude is thus a means of adumbrating a “figure of reading” he
thinks endemic to all literary texts. Of course, the first theorist to address the problem of
autobiography in the “great soliloquy” was, in fact, Wordsworth himself: his treatments
of the vacancy between “two consciousnesses,” the problem of “after-meditation,” and
the “perplexed epistemology of autobiography” are all, appropriately enough, preludes to
the readings of subsequent critics and theorists, de Man included (or even de Man
especially). Though he may never have admitted the fact, Wordsworth also thought all
writing autobiographical: the centrality and ubiquity of the Prelude in his career and
corpus are testaments to that fact.

11

See, for example, the preceding chapter’s discussion of the physical maladies which, for Wordsworth,
often accompanied composition.
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Yet ultimately, there is a crucial difference between Wordsworth-the-critic and
Wordsworth’s critics—a difference borne not only of time and “distance” from texts but
from the poet’s adamantine resolve to overcome the vacancies, gaps, and lacunae which
permeated his texts. Whereas we, as readers, can safely accept textual instability and
indeterminacy, Wordsworth could not: to do so would have meant compromising the
poetic identity he was constructing within those texts. For this reason, the textual
predicament critics describe as “autobiographical discourse” was, for Wordsworth, the
source and site of profound anxiety. Possessed of (and perhaps by) “the poet’s urgent
need to constitute himself as poet,” he developed a mode of poetic discourse which,
because it took the poet’s subjectivity as its subject, was perpetually subject to the
ineluctable flux of a being-in-time (Jacobus 128). The mutability of the poet’s mind and
the evanescence of the temporal present thus yielded a poetry which was truly “never
secure from the pressure of ‘second thoughts’” (Wolfson, Formal 109).
By means of this curious involute, Wordsworth’s poetry continually reinscribes
the very inadequacies and impasses it wishes to repair: writing is the agent of its own
frustration, because “acts of writing – acts that do not just record memory but themselves
perform, act out, enact commemoration – both produce a poetic self and, at the same
time, disturb any possibility of a coherent articulation of such a self” (Bennett 12,
emphasis added). Yet the impossibility of coherence or wholeness—and further, an
awareness of that impossibility—does not appear to dissuade the poet from pursuing
completion. Writing and rewriting, he struggles against both the self represented within
the poem and that self who has written or is writing the poem. This collision of ends and
means, content and form, creates a poetry which is antithetical unto itself, a poetry which
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is never complete yet refuses to concede its contingency, a poetry which is inexorably
and perpetually in crisis.
Of course, critics have long recognized the connection between Wordsworth’s
verse and a sense of crisis. Indeed, the term has been such a staple of commentary that it
has become the defining element of two entire genres of poetry implicitly associated with
Wordsworth: the crisis lyric and crisis autobiography. The most famous examples of
poems in the former mode include such indispensable works as “Lines written a few
miles above Tintern Abbey,” “Resolution and Independence,” and “Ode: Intimations of
Immortality”—all of which begin with or propose a creative dilemma and then proceed to
offer, if not a solution, some means of compensatory solace. The term crisis
autobiography, however, is consistently reserved for The Prelude itself, as Anne Mellor
explains:
However fragile and tenuous the self linguistically constructed in The Prelude, the
poem’s overt rhetorical argument and structure locate it, as Meyer Abrams argued,
within the genre of “crisis autobiography,” a secularization of seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century religious autobiographies grounded in a narrative of confession and
conversion, of retrospection and introspection, based on the literary model of St.
Augustine’s Confessions. (294)
In contrast to de Man’s “autobiography,” which “is not a genre or mode, but a figure of
reading,” crisis autobiography has a much more specific (and therefore much more
problematic) formal character. Indeed, given The Prelude’s heterogeneous, assimilative
form, one might reasonably reject such a classification as altogether inadequate. But
though there are problems inherent to applying such a label, one can preserve the fusion
of crisis and autobiography in order to illustrate how “anxiety,” which is an oblique and
slightly askew synonym for “crisis” anyway, is at once manifest in and constituent of
Wordsworth’s Prelude.
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In its initial two-book incarnation (1799), The Prelude could be aptly described as
a crisis lyric rather than a crisis autobiography. This is not only a consequence of its
“smaller scope and much more concentrated power” but of the manner in which it begins
(J. Wordsworth 568) —namely, with an especially plaintive and urgent question:
Was it for this
That one, the fairest of all rivers, loved
To blend his murmurs with my nurse’s song,
And from his alder shades and rocky falls,
And from his fords and shallows, sent a voice
That flowed along my dreams? (1799 1.1-6)
Wordsworth provides no context and offers no explanation: “this” is simply “the
crisis”—unnamed, unspecified, and therefore all the more threatening; and the question
which it elicits recurs, accrues more weight, and finally crests at the poem’s twenty-sixth
line, where the poet at last rounds off his periodic question and assumes a declarative
(though still tentative) voice. Although he never supplies a specific antecedent for “this,”
the subsequent content of Part I makes the nature of the crisis it references abundantly
clear: Wordsworth has in some sense “failed” to be the poet he aspires to be. He has
balked in the face of his great task—which, of course, is his nonexistent (but also
ubiquitous) opus, The Recluse, a “philosophical poem, containing views of Man, Nature,
and Society” (Wordsworth, Prose 3:5). The Prelude, as both a literary product and as a
narrative, thus begins at and begins with a manifest creative anxiety, or anxiety about
writing: Wordsworth is, as Jonathan Wordsworth avers, “writing this poem to find out
why he cannot write the one he should” (572). As is always the case in his poems,
Wordsworth’s means of negotiating a present crisis is to return to the past: therein, he
believes, he may find whatever information is necessary to justify himself as a poet,
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reaffirm his vocation, and restore his confidence in those capacities which have been
rendered suspect.
Yet “this” cannot be solved or effaced by any unswerving path from crisis to
resolution or loss to restoration, for in the midst of that retrospective compensatory
movement, Wordsworth must confront the limitations of autobiography—the problem of
“two consciousnesses” which will be acknowledged for the first time in the 1799
Prelude’s second part. Thus, despite the 1799 poet’s concluding declaration that he has
retained—or more accurately, recovered—a “more than Roman confidence, a faith / That
fails not” (II.489-90), the problem initiated by the poem’s opening question does not end
with or within the 1799 Prelude. In order to restore his faith in himself, Wordsworth has
created “Wordsworth”: he has effectively written himself into existence—not only as the
“favored being” or “naked savage in a thunder shower” of the poet’s childhood, but also
as a distinct voice, a lyrical “I” who questions, interprets, and re-orders past experience
(1799 I.70, 26). And as this “I” is a “Wordsworth” grounded in the narrative present of
the current crisis—a Wordsworth who reads from a distinct perspective and within a
particular moment—it represents a self which will inevitably become the prior term in the
alignment between two consciousnesses. Ultimately, the text’s opening “this” is both
semantically and temporally ambiguous: the antecedent which constitutes the crisis-athand must therefore shift with the passage of time.
The entirety of the Prelude—that is, all of the Preludes, the grand text which all
of the poem’s individual texts become—might therefore be described as a type of
compositional reaction-formation: With each fresh reading, and with each subsequent
rewriting, Wordsworth is attempting to quell a crisis (or a felt anxiety) so that his “real”
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work, which presupposes a fully-formed Poet, can proceed. But because The Prelude
represents “a proposition about the past that emerges from this anxiety to construct it in
the present,” it can no sooner dispel anxiety than it creates it anew (Wood 21).
Furthermore, because The Prelude allows for no distinction between artist and artifact,
because it constructs the poet and thereby asserts that the Poet actually is the poem, there
can be no correspondent separation between the poetic (thinking, writing) subject and the
poem’s “subject.” Therefore, the poem is not simply about a crisis, it is the crisis; it does
not only represent or address an anxiety, it is that anxiety.
However pithily described, autobiographical anxiety (as I conceive of it) is not a
phenomenon which can be adequately conveyed in petrified grammatical constructions. It
is dynamic by nature, and consists not of discrete texts but of relationships between texts,
wherein Wordsworth’s (re)readings of himself are realized. Let us consider what happens
to The Prelude’s opening sequence, the “glad preamble,” in the transition from the 1799
crisis lyric to 1805 crisis autobiography:
Then, last wish—
My last and favorite aspiration—then
I yearn towards some philosophic song
Of truth . . .
But from this awful burthen I full soon
Take refuge, and beguile myself with trust
That mellower years will bring a riper mind
And clearer insight. Thus from day to day
I live a mockery of the brotherhood
Of vice and virtue, with no skill to part
Vague longing bred by want of power
From paramount impulse not to be withstood;
A timorous capacity, from prudence;
From circumspection, infinite delay.
Humility and modest awe themselves
Betray me, serving often for a cloak
To a more subtle selfishness, that now
Doth lock up my functions in a blank reserve,

67
Now dupes me with an overanxious eye . . .
Far better to have never heard the name
Of zeal and just ambition than to live
Thus baffled by a mind that every hour
Turns recreant to her task, takes heart again,
Then feels immediately some hollow thought
Hang like an interdict upon her hopes.
This is my lot; for either still I find
Some imperfection in the chosen theme,
Or see of absolute accomplishment
Much wanting—so much wanting—in myself
That I recoil and droop, and seek repose
In indolence from vain perplexity,
Unprofitably travelling towards the grave,
Like a false steward who hath much received
And renders nothing back. (1805 I. 229-276)
In this particular case, Wordsworth’s revisions consist almost wholly of addition.
Whereas the 1799 Prelude had opened with the “Was it for this” sequence, the 1805
version waits 271 lines to pose that most crucial question. In context, this seems a
perfectly reasonable and relatively unremarkable occurrence: Wordsworth is moving
from a poem of two parts and 1,000 lines to an epic poem of 13 books and over 8,000
lines; as the formal demands of a longer work are vastly different than those of a
relatively self-contained (albeit expansive) lyric, the decision to reframe the opening
simply makes sense.12 However, such a substantial textual change can still teach us about
the processes of reading which have informed the poem’s re-conception. The “glad
preamble” can therefore serve as a preliminary case study of Wordsworth’s processes of
revision. To begin with a deceptively simple question: in comparison to the opening of
the two-part Prelude, what does the “glad preamble” actually do?

12

One would be hard pressed to deny such an argument outright. Even Jonathan Wordsworth, a fierce
proponent of the aesthetic superiority of the 1799 Prelude, feels compelled to concede that the two-part
poem “does not constitute an alternative to 1805” (570).
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First of all, the preamble supplies an ample antecedent for the first line’s
previously undefined “this,” exhaustively describing the circumstances surrounding
Wordsworth’s creative consternation. With verbs such as “yearn,” “beguile,” “betray,”
“lock up,” “dupes,” “baffled by,” “turns recreant,” “recoil and droop,” and descriptors
like “awful burthen,” “mockery,” “infinite delay,” “blank reserve,” “interdict,”
“imperfection,” “indolence,” and “vain perplexity,” the passage could hardly be more
emphatically bleak in its portrayal of creative blockage. The descent toward the last line’s
“nothing” is thus meant to place as much rhetorical weight as possible on the ensuing
question’s formerly undefined pronoun. Eventually, this strategy provokes (or is meant to
provoke) an equally forceful recovery: by the close of the first book the poet feels not
only that his “mind hath been revived” but also that he has now fixed firmly on a “theme
/ Single and of determined bounds,” thereby achieving a type of certainty which is the
direct antidote to any lingering “vain perplexity” (1805 1.665, 668-69).
Yet even as it works so strenuously to establish the poem’s archetypal pattern of
fall and redemption, or crisis and recovery, or “imagination impaired” and “imagination
restored,” the preamble (explicitly modeled on the traditional epic’s invocation) invokes a
process that will ultimately threaten the stability of The Prelude’s structural schema: that
of “self-constituting self-address” or (less eloquently) “self-conscious poetic selfconsciousness.” While critics have adopted a variety of frames for understanding this
discursive phenomenon, Mary Jacobus’s explanation is perhaps most helpful. “The
voice,” she writes, “is always a doubling of self, and more often a multiplication or
alienation” (132). For this reason, the doubly self-conscious turn (note: troping) of
Wordsworth’s lyric voice in the preamble does not so much unify The Prelude as it
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creates or reveals certain gaps or “vacancies” inherent in its narrative scheme. Describing
this turn as a “turning-away” or, in formal terms, apostrophe, Jacobus elaborates upon its
consequences as follows:
Regarded as a digressive form, a sort of interruption, excess, or redundance,
apostrophe in The Prelude becomes the signal instance of the rupture of the temporal
scheme of memory by the time of writing. Wordsworth’s ‘two consciousnesses’
(Prel. II, 32) can then be seen as a division, not simply between me-now and me-then,
but between discursive time and narrative time—a radical discontinuity which
ruptures the illusion of sequentiality and insists, embarrassingly, on self-presence and
voice; insists too that invocation itself may be more important than what is invoked.
(129)
It is important that the division between “discursive time and narrative time” does not
simply replace or supplant the more simplistic “me-now and me-then” binary. Instead,
apostrophe compounds or complicates the poem’s “temporal scheme” by “signaling” the
presence of a meta-textual voice—the voice of the poet-writing, or what has formerly
been identified as a mode of “self-constituting self-address.” By these means,
Wordsworth’s “two-consciousnesses” have been re-doubled: rather than reveal a
straightforward negotiation between “I” and “some other being,” the poem now evinces a
much more “perplexed epistemology” wherein each successive self is othered by an
auditing voice. Wordsworth writes about Wordsworth-writing who is in turn writing
about Wordsworth: the lyric “I” is not a stable, singular subject but a reflexive fiction
which continually divulges—or at least exposes—its own conceit(s).
The results of this internecine, inward-turning struggle are evident in the text of
the preamble. The “mind” which “turns” and turns once again, cycling through despair
and hope, is caught within a meditative loop which (re)duplicates or parallels the path of
the poet-writing, who is likewise trying to fix upon some coherent, stable self so that he
might proceed with the task at hand. Further, the lyric I’s lack of “skill to part” or parse

70
the emotional antecedents of his current crisis is analogous to the “circumspection” of the
text itself, which, due to its consummate self-awareness, is enacting the very process(es)
it describes. Ultimately, the “glad preamble” is not merely an introduction to
Wordsworth’s “crisis autobiography” but also a catalyst which actuates the poem’s
autobiographical crisis: as Jacobus writes, “the ‘glad preamble’ initiates not only The
Prelude, but the problem of its composition” (130).
Yet, because “composition” never means only “writing” (i.e., the literal act of
inscription) but always denotes tandem processes of reading and writing, it might be
more accurate to say that the preamble initiates the problem of reading which in turn
initiates (indeed, becomes) The Prelude. Of course, “reading” has a rather expansive
definition here, at once signifying the physical act of reading a written text and more
intangible processes of self-reading, including introspection, self-analysis, and memory.
Nevertheless, the most crucial of these is still the physical act itself—the very literal
(re)reading of poetic texts which accompanied the first major revision and expansion of
The Prelude in 1804-05. By necessity, all other “types” of reading—and for that matter,
all other “figures of reading”—converge in this act: Wordsworth’s “overanxious eye”
yields an overanxious “I,” and the poet is thus compelled to unfix and remake the poem
in order to remake the idea of the Poet found therein.
The importance of the text’s physicality cannot be overestimated. However
ponderous our abstractions, however intricate our critical systems, they cannot outweigh
the concrete, material reality of the text as an artifact or surface which can be touched,
written upon, manipulated, or effaced. To speak of a poem and of “remaking” that poem
is to speak not only of a process of rethinking or reconception, but also of a literal
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reworking which visibly alters the text in order to realize a re-(en)visioned idea. Any
reading of The Prelude—no matter how resolute its conviction that the poem is a plural,
unstable text—must ultimately return to the physical site of reading and writing. This is
true not only for the critic but for Wordsworth himself. Revision begins in an actual
encounter between writer and writing, poet and poem. De Man’s “specular moment” of
alignment; the divide between two consciousnesses; ruptures between poetic past and
present or between discursive and narrative time: all are ways of construing and
understanding the ostensibly simple, quotidian act of reading a manuscript.
This simplification does not trivialize that encounter. Quite the contrary, it helps
to explain precisely how and why Wordsworth continually revised his texts. The Prelude
is an “achieved anxiety” because it is at once a means of negotiating a crisis and the
source of that crisis: the poem no sooner dispels anxiety than it creates it anew. However,
one cannot completely understand why the supposedly purgative process of writing (the
poet’s “talking cure,” as it were) would induce further turmoil until one considers the
materiality of the text. As an artifact, as an object external to the poet, the poem becomes
separate from the poet—a “not-me” or Other to the poet’s own person. In the case of The
Prelude, wherein the poet is the poem, this means that with every rereading, Wordsworth
was confronting a self now fixed in time and text—a former self or “other being” who
was in the past and therefore subject to the same ineffable vacancy between two
consciousnesses. Given Wordsworth’s implicit need to bridge that gap, to maintain the
“unique, unitary, transcendental subjectivity” of the Poet despite his awareness of the
difficulties therein, this means that rereading must always yield revision (Mellor 298).
Ultimately, if the “I” of the poem is to keep up with the eye of the poet, it must be either
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continually updated to reflect the present poet or fixed by some unchanging, stable center
which can endure the passage of time and preserve the ideality of the poetic subject.
For Wordsworth, the present was always a crisis in waiting. His response to the
mutability and impermanence of the lyric “I” was therefore to delve into his past, wherein
he believed he could find sufficient stability to perpetually restore the present poetic self.
This method is evident not only in The Prelude but across the whole of his corpus. As
M.H. Abrams writes, in Wordsworth’s poetry “the scene is a scene revisited”: his
“favorite device of déjà vu” is a structural device employed so that the past may become
present and the present may be fixed in both space and time (“Structure” 211). As
Wordsworth readily concedes, such revisitation invariably results in reinterpretation. The
scene is “made new” not merely because it has been invoked or called forth, but because
it has been read or tapped as a source of restoration.
Crucially, this type of “retrospective site reading” duplicates precisely what
happens when Wordsworth revisits his texts. And since revisitation (or rereading) is
almost always accompanied by revision, the structural device or organizing principle also
determines the poet’s relationship with the text. Ultimately, the poem itself is a scene
revisited: the “new” consciousness of the poet—his particular, present “I”—has been
superimposed over the old.
In this way, Wordsworth’s poetry habitually subverts the disparity between
present and past, not by denying that difference but by attempting to negate it through a
rewriting of the landscape / text itself. Yet reworking is also destruction—of previous
meaning(s), of former readings, and thus of a previous self. This scenario of revisitation
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and “obliterated readings” is most evident in Wordsworth’s famous “spots of time,”
which are the central structural device of the Prelude in all its incarnations:
There are in our existence spots of time,
Which with distinct preeminence retain
A renovating virtue, whence, depressed
By false opinion and contentious thought,
Or aught of heavier or more deadly weight
In trivial occupations and the round
Of ordinary intercourse, our minds
Are nourished and invisibly repaired— (1805 XI.257-64)
Wordsworth’s “spots” at once justify and constitute a method of reading or rereading the
past: they are scenes or moments which “retain” their “renovating virtue” despite the
vicissitudes of time and, therefore, offer a source and site of spiritual stability. Each
representative “spot” follows a similar structure and scenario. First, the poet, wracked by
current anxiety, uncertainty, or loss, describes a particularly poignant scene from his past
(usually, childhood); then, in a representative moment of “after-meditation,” the poet
reinterprets (often ambiguously) the scene so that it becomes a source of present succor,
solace, or self-knowledge; finally, this knowledge is incorporated into the narrative thrust
which constitutes the “growth of the poet’s mind.” The spot thereby becomes not simply
an inert moment but an active “virtue” which restores, renovates, or repairs.
Yet the spots are much more than an anodyne for the poet’s beleaguered mind. As
Geoffrey Hartman writes, they have a peculiarly potent (and ambiguous) formal
character:
It is hard to decide whether the first or second member of the partitive construction
“spots of time” should be emphasized. If we derive the origin of the notion from
Wordsworth’s attraction to specific place (the omphalos or spot syndrome), and notice
that “spot” is subtly used in two senses—as denoting particular places in nature, and
fixed points in time (“islands in the unnavigable depth / Of our departed time”)—the
emphasis would fall on the initial word. But the natural pull of the phrase, and the fact
that these spots are not only in time, like islands, but also creative of time or of a
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vivifying temporal consciousness, throws the emphasis to the second noun and evokes
a beaconing “time-spot.” The concept is, in any case, very rich, fusing not only time
and place but also stasis and continuity. The fixity or fixation that points to an
apocalyptic consciousness of self is temporalized, reintegrated in the stream of life.
(212)
The spots are not only in time but of time: they are focused “moments” of composition—
moments of (specular) alignment between those “mutually reflexive” Wordsworths who
stare back at one another from the surface of the stream. Moreover, as the spots are
moments of writing, the various versions of the spots—as found within each successive
Prelude—become “spots” in their own right, though constituted of non-narrative time.
Instead, for the later Wordsworth, these early texts of the Prelude would consist of spots
of discursive time. In this way, the “spots of time” trope structures both the poem and
Wordworth’s reading(s) of the poem: he has adopted or internalized the central figure of
his own poem and made of it an active, applicable method or figure of reading. Thus, the
mode of re-membering and re-enacting evident in the poetry itself is abstracted to
Wordsworth’s compositional processes when re-experiencing (rereading) the poem as a
whole. The poem itself provides the form or principle for the poet’s reconception of it;
the formal aspects of the text(s) have become modes of thought.
But what process is at work here? What mechanism of (self-)consciousness is
propelling revision? It is not enough to refer to the process as “anxiety” in a blanket
sense; one must describe the relationship in terms which may eventually serve to explain
not only the poet’s inward turn but the poetic atrophy which resulted from that turn.
Wordsworth’s motivating anxiety was one of reading and writing, of autobiography, of
the perceived vacancy between two consciousnesses—an anxiety which does not simply
cause the poem but is the poem. But the precise nature of the conflict implicit within
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those processes (for they are ongoing) is yet undefined. Autobiography may well be a
highly problematic “figure of reading” and “revision . . . the very trope of
autobiography,” but this merely suggests perpetual change without positing a trajectory.
To explain how an “autobiographical anxiety” could become not only a force which
yielded revision but a force which provoked an ultimately corrosive form of revision, one
needs both a means of understanding precisely what is at stake in the confrontation
between present and past poetic selves and a means of assessing that struggle’s costs and
consequences. As the next chapter will demonstrate, an apt frame for such an analysis can
be found in Harold Bloom’s theory of poetic influence, often called simply “the anxiety
of influence.”

Chapter 4: The “Anxiety of Influence” Turned Inward
“Influence, as I conceive of it,” Harold Bloom writes, “means that there are no
texts, but only relationships between texts” (Map 3). What precisely he means by
“influence” will require much elaboration. Nevertheless, the connection between his
theory of poetry and my reading of Wordsworth begins at this statement. For Bloom,
whose entire system depends on the presence of what he calls “intra-poetic
relationships,”13 it represents an indispensable axiom; for me, it constitutes a way of
thinking especially well-suited to Wordsworth, who truly attempted to shape his corpus
into a single, profusely connected (and internally coherent) body. In order to understand
Wordsworthian revision, one must have a way of describing the relationships between his
texts or textualized selves. This is the most basic way in which I wish to employ the term
“influence”: as a comprehensive figure, concept, or descriptor of those elemental forces
which characterize the relationship(s) between successive versions of a poem and of the
successive Wordsworths realized therein.
To begin, one needs a working idea of Bloom’s theory of influence. Though
highly complex and often abstruse, the essential argument in The Anxiety of Influence and
A Map of Misreading may be summarized as follows:
“Poetic influence” or “the anxiety of influence” refers primarily to the
(ant)agonistic relationship between a new poet (the “ephebe”or “latecomer”) and an
earlier poet (the “precursor”) wherein the ephebe, who implicitly feels overshadowed or
overdetermined by the precursor, struggles to differentiate him- or herself from the
13

Curiously enough, and for reasons to be explained later, these relationships may also be accurately
described as “inter-poetic” relationships. Presumably, Bloom’s adamant prefix is another means by which
he reinforces the preceding axiom: as he allows for no discrete texts, any relationship between them would
necessarily be “within.” This concept of a boundless inter-text also reveals the distinctly Deconstructive
elements in Bloom’s theory—elements which, it seems to me, are often ignored by his readers.
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precursor, thereby attaining creative autonomy and imaginative priority. This antithetical
process both compels and results from a “complex act of strong misreading” or “creative
interpretation” of the precursor poem which Bloom calls “poetic misprision.” According
to Bloom, poetic misprision is only the first in an interlocking and antithetical series of
psychopoetic tropes / defenses whereby the ephebe either becomes a “strong poet” or
falls short of that achievement. The practical efficacy of this theory of poetry lies in the
fact that these six tropes offer
six interpretations of influence, six ways of reading/misreading intra-poetic
relationships, which means six ways of reading a poem, six ways that intend to
combine into a single scheme of complete interpretations, at once rhetorical,
psychological, imagistic and historical, though this is an historicism that deliberately
reduces to the interplay of personalities. But because my tropes are not tropes only,
but also psychic defenses, what I call “influence” is a figuration for poetry itself; not
as the relation of product to source, or effect to cause, but as the greater relation of
latecomer poet to precursor, or of reader to text, or of poem to the imagination, or of
the imagination to the totality of our lives. (Map 71)
Bloom’s theory of intra-poetic relations thus aspires to become a totalizing, all-inclusive,
omni-applicable trope of tropes which subsumes not only poetry qua poetry but also the
Poet and the poetic psyche as such. Influence is conceived as a “metaphor for reading” in
a context wherein “nothing is outside of the [poetic] text”:
Every poem we know begins as an encounter between poems. I am aware that poets
and their readers prefer to believe otherwise, but acts, persons, and places, if they are
to be handled by poems at all, must themselves be treated first as though they were
already poems, or parts of poems. Contact, in a poem, means contact with another
poem, even if that poem is called a deed, person, place or thing. What I mean by
“influence” is the whole range of relationships between one poem and another, which
means that my use of “influence” is itself a highly conscious trope, indeed a complex
sixfold trope that intends to subsume six major tropes: irony, synecdoche, metonymy,
hyperbole, metaphor, and metalepsis, and in just that ordering. (Map 70)
While we need not delve into these subsidiary tropes, it is worth noting that Bloom never
attempts to deny the figurative or tropological nature—that is, the literariness—of his
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own theory. “A theory which presents itself as a severe poem,” he declares, “may be
judged, and ask to be judged, as argument” (Anxiety 13).
The avowedly rhetorical, self-consciously poetic character of the “anxiety of
influence” comprises part of the reason why it constitutes an especially apposite means of
addressing the problem of Wordsworth’s decline and the process of Wordsworthian
revision. One does not need to accept Bloom’s argument in its entirety. Instead, one may
adopt (and adapt) his theory based upon the efficacy of “influence” as a figure for
reading Wordsworth within the decidedly rhetorical context of his poetic oeuvre.
Previously, I have concluded that because The Prelude is a poem which implicitly forms
its Poet, the relationship between Wordsworth’s palimpsestuous selves is fundamentally a
relationship between texts. I have also insisted that what happens to the Poet-in-a-poem
can have a profound impact on the poet-without the poem (or the poet-writing). I have
not, however, presumed to venture outside of a specifically poetic context, nor would I
insist that these conclusions are necessarily transferrable to any poet other than
Wordsworth. Instead, I am relying on what I believe to be a sound hermeneutic principle:
that a “theory about the self, in some sense, becomes the practice of a self which
conditions the forms of future theorization. The same is true of any practice, including
that of literature, of writing” (Waugh 16).
Most critics consider Bloom’s theory especially problematic because it represents
a highly suspect, even potentially dangerous sort of theory: namely, one which makes
“evidence-free, globalizing pronouncements” and, because it cannot be tested (or
refuted), is all too easily “regarded as a generalizing template” (Waugh 16). However,
this problem may be avoided by coupling Bloom’s theory with a de Manian emphasis on
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rhetoric. Indeed, in his original review of The Anxiety of Influence, de Man suggested
that one might easily and usefully transfer Bloom’s concept of influence—and its
associated “revisionary ratios”—from a primarily psychological context to one which
was explicitly linguistic or rhetorical:
What is achieved by thus translating back from a subject-centered vocabulary of intent
and desire to a more linguistic terminology? If we admit that the term “influence” it
itself a metaphor that dramatizes a linguistic structure into a diachronic narrative, then
it follows that Bloom’s categories of misreading not only operate between authors, but
also between the various texts of a single author or, within a given text, between the
different parts, down to each particular chapter, paragraph, sentence, and, finally,
down to the interplay between literal and figurative meaning within a single word or
grammatical sign. (Blindness 276)
De Man’s statements must be tempered: there is no value in reducing influence to such a
particularized interplay of minutiae that one attempts to discern it “within a single word
or grammatical sign.” Nevertheless, his suggestion that influence may operate between
the texts of a single author is pivotal, for it allows one to use Bloom’s central concept (as
well as many of its corollaries) while avoiding many of its pitfalls. The “anxiety of
influence” may therefore lead us toward an understanding of the tropological agon
manifest in Wordsworth’s poetry. By these means, we can not only understand how
Wordsworth’s verse—in that autobiographical moment of anxiety—reacts upon itself and
compels revision but also explain the motive force behind revision as a path to semantic
and aesthetic decline.
The reason for combining Bloom’s system and de Man’s questioning perspective
lies in what each “system” lacks: a degree of balance between skepticism and aesthetic
positivism. While de Man grates against any “referential” function in literature, Bloom
grants that a theory of criticism reliant on metaphor can nevertheless become a practical
criticism. He therefore allows a rhetorical effect to radiate outward and affect the poet
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himself (who is a rhetorical effect anyway, though a substantial one). This allowance for
a link between between textual effects and a more or less empirical, writing self allows
one to demonstrate that what occurred within Wordsworth’s poetry, as a rhetorical effect,
actually resulted in a substantial and real decline in the poet himself.
Yet even with that delimited context, I do not wish to appropriate Bloom’s theory
wholesale. For this reason, I will not use the entirety of his “system” (including the
majority of his revisionary ratios and their psychoanalytic or kabbalistic compliments).
Instead, I will make use of his concept of misreading—of creative misreading as an
attempt to “swerve” from one’s precursor and thereby sublimate anxiety; of “misprision”
as an act of reading which seeks to create difference for the sake of maintaining the
ephebe’s (illusions of) autonomy and priority; of influence itself, which is a “metaphor
for reading” as a process which may limit and encumber the poet who does not manage to
overcome his precursor. In and across the plural texts of the Prelude, the ongoing conflict
between Wordsworth-reading and Wordsworth-writing (i.e., between the poet-writing
and the poet figured in the text) at different “spots” in time enacts the dynamic of
influence Bloom detects between ephebe and the poetic precursor. This schema of interpoetic relationships14 is applicable because it reaches toward certain axiomatic
characteristics of Wordsworth’s revisionary processes—including, most notably, the fact
that those processes are generated by mechanisms of self-consciousness produced by and
constituent of autobiographical discourse.
According to Bloom, “Poetic influence, or . . . poetic misprision is necessarily the
study of the life-cycle of the poet-as-poet” (Anxiety 7). On this basis, he appropriates (and
heavily revises) Freud, “predicating that these revisionary ratios have the same function
14

I have deliberately altered Bloom’s “intra-poetic” for the sake of clarity.
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in intra-poetic relations that defense mechanisms have in our psychic life” (Anxiety 88).
Reaction-formation, regression, repression, sublimation, introjections and projection—all
are subsumed by Bloom’s “map of misreading,” which is essentially a deliberate and selfconscious figure (“trope of tropes”) for the motions of the poetic ego. Perhaps as a result
of his Freudian appropriations, Bloom is insistent that the anxiety of influence must
necessarily arise from an encounter with poetic precursor or semi-Oedipal father: “We
need to stop thinking of any poet as an autonomous ego, however solipsistic the strongest
of poets may be,” he writes; “[e]very poet is a being caught up in a dialectical
relationship (transference, repetition, error, communication) with another poet or poets”
(Anxiety 91). To some extent, this represents an eminently reasonable demystification of
the poetic subject: poets are not, after all, formed in a vacuum, and the poetic psyche is
just as subject to external stimuli as any other.
Yet even as it appears to demystify poetic production, this movement outward
towards other poets creates a similarly obscure rubric for the operation of influence
within that “intra-poetic” network. Ultimately, what is left to chance—or, rather, left to
the discretion of the critic—is the identification of an individual poet’s poetic
precursor(s). And as the identification of influence-anxiety does not, as Bloom openly
admits, necessarily depend on the critic’s identification of specific textual affinities, one
is left with a substantial “gray area” wherein the only force at work is the critic’s own “I.”
At this point, Bloom’s pronouncements become untenable. His readings of poets and
their precursors, while often insightful, are questionable both because they lack a means
of explicitly connecting the poems at hand and because they allow the network of
influence-anxiety to be at once incredibly nebulous and strangely exclusive. Additionally,
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though his theory depends explicitly on a precursor / ephebe dyad, he never conclusively
demonstrates what, specifically, links these particular poets nor why one poetic father is
any more dominant than another. The terms of each agon he cites are perpetually open to
question. Thus, as the network expands outward to subsume a greater scope of intrapoetic relationships, it becomes progressively more insubstantial.
But what if we ground our judgments in an intra-poetic network we can be sure
did exist? If influence is “a metaphor for reading,” then it stands to reason that one could
both detect influence anxiety at work and trace its consequences with greater certainty
when the processes of that reading are visible to the critical eye (Map 73). Bloom would
no doubt object, as he does in response to de Man’s aforementioned proposal, that this
represents a dangerously reductive perspective:
Paul de Man would insist that in the study of this struggle for reversal, the linguistic
model usurps the psychological one because language is a substitute system
responsive to the will, but the psyche is not. But that is to interpret the term
“influence” as one trope only, as a metaphor that transforms encounters between
linguistic structures into diachronic narratives. Influence would thus be reduced to
semantic tension, to an interplay between literal and figurative meanings. As the
sixfold, composite trope outlines above, influence remains subject-centered, a personto-person relationship, not to be reduced to the problematic of language. From the
viewpoint of criticism, a trope is just as much a concealed mechanism of defense, as a
defense is a concealed trope. The burden for readers continues to be that poetry,
despite all its protests, continues to be a discursive mode, whose structures evade the
language that would confine them. (Map 76-7)
Bloom’s rebuttal, though forceful, relies too heavily upon a weak assumption: that to
internalize influence-anxiety (in any sense) would necessarily mean its reduction to a
purely “linguistic model” wherein the only tension at work is “semantic” and a “problem
of language.” Granted, this is perhaps an apt response to de Man, for whom all (quite
literally) is rhetoric. But if we accept that influence can remain “subject-centered” when
it pertains to a mind actively reflecting upon itself, then there need be no diminution.
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“Poems,” Blooms writes, “are neither about ‘subjects’ nor about ‘themselves.’ They are
necessarily about other poems; a poem is a response to a poem, as a poet is a response to
a poet, as a person to his parent” (Map 18). Very well. But what happens when a poem is
divided from itself and a poet from himself by the “vacancy” which intrudes between
“two consciousnesses”? He also writes that “influence anxiety does not so much concern
the forerunner but rather is an anxiety achieved in and by the story, novel, play, poem, or
essay” (Anxiety xxiii). If, by means of this perpetual synecdoche, poets indeed are their
poems, and if influence is a transaction between poems which occurs primarily because
those poems are separated by time (which creates one precursor and one latecomer), then
why could a poet (re)reading himself not be subject to the same sense of otherness,
difference, and distance?
Autobiography inevitably bifurcates the writing subject; Wordsworth-writing is
not a single, unitary, transcendental self but a self radically divided in the very act of
composing itself. When one adds to this the fact that Wordsworth, when he revised, was
separated from a former self by “vacancies” of up to forty years, then there is no reason
why one cannot internalize influence without any egregious reduction of the concept.
Admittedly, some reduction is evident: one is no longer speaking of relationships across
the ages but of only “the life-cycle of the poet as poet.” But this does not “cheapen” that
process or reduce its visible impact upon the poem: an internalized anxiety of influence
may well begin at semantic tension, but its impact is felt by the very real, very substantial
poet himself. Circumscribing influence in such a way represents a more stable application
of Bloom’s figure of reading. Poetic influence is indeed “a disease of self-consciousness”
and “a part, of which self-revisionism and self-rebegetting is the whole” (Map 72), but it
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need not consist of such an obscure relationship between disparate persons. Wordsworth,
whom Bloom calls “the great revisionist,” was very much driven by the need to
overcome a precursor, but that precursor was not an external, spectral poetic father.
Instead, the “Great Original” from which Wordsworth sought to wrest priority was a past
version of himself—a Poet begat of a poem, fixed within that poem, and thereby
antithetical to Wordsworth’s most urgent need, “the constant need to reaffirm his own
genius and difference” (Hartman, “Revisited” 13).
In summary: The Prelude is a poem born of crisis, of doubt, and of “the poet’s
urgent need to constitute himself as poet” (Jacobus 128); its ends are poetic priority and
creative autonomy, its means a return to, and creative (mis)reading of, the past. Yet
because autobiography is never simply “about” the past but about the present, and
because the poem could not suppress its awareness of the “vacancies”15 inherent to that
form, Wordsworth was compelled to remake the poem each time the Poet therein
appeared to countermand the poet-writing. In this context, previous texts were necessarily
(re)figured as errors—misrepresentations of the poet Wordsworth wished himself to be.
Other poems are therefore threats; for Wordsworth, this held true even when—especially
when—those poems were his own. The resulting struggle for priority, fundamentally a
struggle between texts, not only produces fresh composition but creates a need for
difference. Rereading and rewriting thus converge in a comprehensive attempt to
“swerve” from previous poem and Poet—or, more accurately, from the previous poet’s
reading of the prior poem. Each successive version of The Prelude is essentially a
“creative interpretation” or misreading of its precursor (Anxiety xxiii).

15

The term is Wordsworth’s, as used in the “two consciousnesses” passage (1805 2.29).
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That said, misreading is not by default a constrictive or corrosive process. Quite
to the contrary, it is often both a necessary and productive “revisionary ratio.” Further, to
call the Prelude’s successive versions “misreadings” is not necessarily to suggest that
there is an original, stable, superior meaning which the revised texts have somehow
compromised: autobiographical writing always imposes difference, and thus a search for
any unequivocal ur-text of past experience (even by the poet himself) seeks that which
does not exist. Zachary Leader’s response to entrenched “earlier-is-better” arguments is
correct: “ there is no necessary reason why poetry written ‘closer’ to the sources of
Wordsworth’s inspiration should be any better than poetry written ‘further’ from it,
particularly when we are talking—as is often the case with variant readings—of very
short distances in time” (658-59). However, Leader has failed to recognize that
Wordsworth’s revisions are not responses to or reinterpretations of any unmitigated,
uncompromised “source” but rather responses to other readings. As Wordsworth himself
so readily points out, memory is inherently a creative faculty that (re)interprets
experience even in the act of recall. The temporal distance between experience and text
or between text and revised text, though undeniably important, is therefore not the sole
force driving and shaping revision. Instead, the distance between Wordsworth’s texts is a
result of, first, the semantic polyphony which emerges in the act of reading; and second,
the consequent imposition of layers of interpretation—layers which vitiate and obscure
meaning not because they fail to capture any essential center, but because they introduce
readings which incessantly question the very grounds of their own existence. As Susan
Wolfson writes, “Wordsworth’s sensitivity to ‘other possible answers’ remains an
interference that results in continued and prolonged revisions” (“Answering” 45). Such a
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“deconstructive questioning” yields a mode of poetry which first figures past readings as
errors only to then reinscribe a new error via misreading which will, in turn, subsequently
be subject to the same self-conscious critique. Ultimately, the quality of Wordsworth’s
poetry suffers not because the poet has grown old, but because the poem, site and source
of anxiety, has taken its own methods of reading to an unparalleled extreme. The scene
has become a scene too often revisited, and the resulting traffic of readings overwhelms
gestures toward clarity and fixity. With every revision, The Prelude attempts to claim
imaginative priority for this moment and this poet, but the changes necessary to do so
usurp the basis of their own textual authority.
In the following, the goal will not be to look for changes to the text which
explicitly demonstrate qualitative decline. Because it treats revisions as effects of an
extraneous diminishment, such a “comparative” reading would inevitably fail to consider
how those revisions are causes of the same process they signify. Instead, I am looking for
moments of alignment between “two consciousnesses,” moments of (self-)reading
wherein the differences between the Prelude’s plural texts divulge the poet-writing’s
literal re-visioning of a previous textual self. In these moments, one can track the ongoing
struggle between the poet-writing and precursor texts. Ultimately, this will make it
possible to not only detect the presence of an “anxiety of influence” but to reach certain
conclusions about the effects, costs, and consequences of that anxiety.
Since one cannot possibly attend to every significant moment of revision in The
Prelude, it is necessary to focus on a small number of representative sites or scenes of
misreading. As it happens, the poem itself provides a principal of selection via its reliance
on “spots of time.” Just as The Prelude is the center and “scripture” of Wordsworth’s
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corpus, the “spots of time” are the functional center of The Prelude. Within the poem,
they act as both the dominant structural motif and the central trope, organizing and
producing meaning. Further, the “spots of time” are present in all versions of the Prelude,
and in every version they are the bedrock upon which the rest of the poem is built, either
functioning as semantic centers (“primal scenes,” as it were) or climactic sequences.
In the 1799 Prelude, the spots are not only key moments, but constitute the bulk
of the text. The most prominent of these sequences include the “Drowned Man of
Esthwaite Water,” the “Murderer at Penrith / Beacon on the Summit,” “Waiting for
Horses,” and the “Stolen Boat”; but practically every significant movement of the poem
abides by the pattern of description and reflection essential to a “spot.” In the transition to
the intermediate five book version of 1804, all of the spots are retained and some
dispersed, but now the previously quoted spots of time “thesis” and its contiguous
episodes (the “Murderer at Penrith” and “Waiting for Horses”) become the terminal
movement of the poem, thus amplifying their importance. Concomitantly, the ascent of
Mount Snowdon, which first appears at the opening of the fifth book of the Five Book
Prelude (notably, as the climax which precedes the resolution formed by the central spot
sequence), is itself another instance of a “spot of time”—a scene meant to become, as it
were, the “highest” spot of the poem as a whole. And although this arrangement will be
further altered with the expansion to thirteen and finally fourteen books (in 1805 and
1850, respectively), the spots will once again retain their importance: they are,
evocatively, the means by which an “impaired” imagination is “restored.”
Given all of these facts, it is clear that the spots are focal points for revision—both
in terms of their actual content and their position in the poem. One may therefore turn to
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them in order to track the processes of misreading constituent of and produced by
Wordsworth’s revisions. To further narrow analysis and facilitate inter-textual reading,
the remainder of my argument will focus on the central “spots of time” sequence, which
contains the “spots of time” thesis, “Murderer at Penrith,” and “Waiting for Horses.” The
sequence may be found at the following points in the texts of The Prelude: 1799: I.288374; Five Book Prelude: V.280-389; 1805: XI.257-395; and 1850: XII.208-335.
We have already discussed the extra-textual importance of the “spots of time”
trope and considered the structure of that “epic simile” which was “launched to image the
perplexed epistemology of writing and reading autobiography” (Wolfson, Formal 128).
We have also concluded (tentatively) that Wordsworth’s explication of the formal
problems implicit to autobiography provides the most accessible (and internally coherent)
means of reading The Prelude. Thus, prior to reading the spots as they exist in different
versions of the poem, we may describe the following scenario: The different texts of the
“spots” are themselves “spots” (places, times) of reading, and constitute an enacted
“specular moment” wherein the poet, “incumbent o’er the surface of past time,” attempts
to read what he believes to be an “original” experience. However, this reading is
frustrated and impaired because the texts and their implicit interpretations are interfering
with his vision: he is effectively reading through the Wordsworth on the surface—i.e., the
Wordsworth-writing in the past. As versions multiply and interpretations compound, the
surface becomes more complex and more opaque, and the anxiety of “other selves”
grows more acute. Wordsworth’s attempts to penetrate the patina of “after-meditation”
must follow suit, and therefore grow increasingly more forceful and intricate. The
complexity of these rereadings, though constituent of a strong interpretive offense, serves
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to ensure that later revisitations of the spot or scene will be even more difficult. In an
attempt to fend off the volleys of these accrued selves, the character of subsequent
revisions will become increasingly more defensive. Difference is imposed as a bulwark
against an incipient deluge of former readings.
Although the combative terms of this description might make it appear
hyperbolic, such rhetoric is justified given the extrinsic and intrinsic torsion of the spots
of time. To begin, consider the central statement of Wordsworth’s master-trope. In the
inaugural “Two-Part Prelude,” the “spots of time” thesis reads as follows:
There are in our existence spots of time
Which with distinct preeminence retain
A fructifying virtue, whence, depressed
By trivial occupations and the round
Of ordinary intercourse, our minds—
Especially the imaginative power—
Are nourished and invisibly repaired;
Such moments chiefly seem to have their date
In our first childhood. (1.288-96)
In the “Five Book Prelude,” the line is end-stopped at “repaired” and the terminal clause
opened up:
Such moments, worthy of all gratitude,
Are scattered everywhere, and take their date
In our first childhood – in our childhood even
Perhaps are most conspicuous. (5.287-89)
But the only significant change is the suggestion that the spots are more numerous and
diffuse in memory than previously supposed. However, by 1805 the passage has been
altered to include a more substantial, rhetorically weighty description of the forces
“depressing” the mind and a second iteration of the sentence’s principal subject, “virtue”:
There are in our existence spots of time,
Which with distinct preeminence retain
A renovating virtue, whence, depressed
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By false opinion and contentious thought,
Or aught of heavier or more deadly weight
In trivial occupations and the round
Of ordinary intercourse, our minds
Are nourished and invisibly repaired—
A virtue, by which pleasure is enhanced,
That penetrates, enables us to mount
When high, more high, and lifts us up when fallen. (1805 XI.257-67)
In and of itself, this revision places considerably more emphasis upon the spot’s
“renovating” potential: “virtue” is supplied with not only two restorative functions
(“nourished” and “repaired”) but also with a series of brusque, forceful, ameliorative
verbs (“enhanced,” “penetrates,” “enables,” “mount,” “lifts”) which, accompanying the
rolling rhythm of the line, ascend toward a tranquil yet triumphant syntactical plateau.
Yet what is even more significant is the exclusion of the formerly brisk transition into the
first actual “spot.” In 1799, the “Murderer at Penrith” begins immediately after the
conclusion of the opening sentence (at “childhood”); in the “Five Book Prelude,” the
onset of the spot is delayed only slightly; but in the 1805 text, one finds a newly
interpolated passage of eleven lines and three sentences, which reads as follows:
This efficacious spirit chiefly lurks
Among those passages of life in which
We have had deepest feeling that the mind
Is lord and master, and that outward sense
Is but the obedient servant of her will.
Such moments, worthy of all gratitude,
Are scattered everywhere, taking their date
From our first childhood—in our childhood even
Perhaps are most conspicuous. Life with me,
As far as memory can look back, is full
Of this beneficent influence. (1805, XI.268-78)
This extended description of the “efficacious spirit” amplifies the potential strength of the
spots but concomitantly circumscribes where or what they may be: they are to consist of
moments wherein the poetic mind, now “lord and master,” rules “outward sense”
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(sensory experience) by fiat, subjugating everything extrinsic to its will. Though
accomplished in relatively few lines, Wordsworth’s rereading of the master-trope will
inflect the entirety of the principal “spots of time” sequence and do so in a manner which
amply evinces influence-anxiety at work. His revisions reveal the following:
First, a more deliberate, drastic, and even violent attempt to compensate for some
perceived loss. In the first version of the passage, the mind is “depressed” only by the
quotidian motions of “trivial occupations and the round / Of ordinary intercourse,” and
the “fructifying virtue” of the spot is sufficient to nourish and invisibly repair any
consequent impairment of the imaginative power. In later versions, the weight of
depressive forces becomes “heavier” and even “deadly,” and the equal and opposite
compensatory motion redoubles as well, gaining sufficient force to become not only
strong but overpowering. The mind is no longer a passive entity which receives or
absorbs the healing influx of memory, but a tyrannical agent which accomplishes what
Geoffrey Hartman has famously termed the “apocalypse of the imagination”—an
absolute domination over external phenomena. This shift is also evident in the subtle but
incredibly significant change from “fructifying virtue” to “vivifying virtue”16 to
“renovating virtue”: whereas “fructifying,” in context, would mean that the mind is made
more fruitful and productive, and “vivifying” would signify an animating, quickening
virtue which brightens or sharpens the mind, “renovating” implies a more decisive sort of
repair—repair not only as the literal mending of what is present, but as a literal remaking
or making anew. The difference lies in the perceived depth of the wound or loss which
each sort of virtue is meant to address: the first reactivates, the second enlivens, the third
16

According to the editors of the Norton edition, “vivifying” was employed in an intermediate manuscript
of the 1805 Prelude (see 428, n.2). Duncan Wu’s version of the “Five Book Prelude” corroborates this
judgment, as the adjective is still “fructifying” in that even earlier intermediate text.

92
literally rebuilds. By the 1805 version, then, Wordsworth’s text implies that some
creative cataclysm has taken place, and that the damage must be countered by an equally
potent compensatory agent. The height of the poet’s climb in the second iteration of
“virtue” is a direct consequence of the depth of his descent.
Having taken note of this amplified sense of loss, we are naturally directed back
to the actual content of the crisis at hand—which (although easy to lose sight of when
reading in isolation) is the “impairment of imagination” or the sudden stymieing of the
creative faculty. In 1799, The Prelude begins on a note of crisis: Wordsworth has failed
to write the poem he thinks he ought to (The Recluse), and thus he asks—in the midst of
that creative anxiety—if it was for this sad state of creative anxiety, idleness, or
consternation that he had been tutored by his beloved River Derwent. In this instance, the
crisis is very much a present crisis: the poem sets out to bridge the poetic impasse
introduced by its opening question. Yet in the 1805 text, where the sequence is not only
removed to the eleventh book but wholly divorced from such immediacy, loss is
something which has already happened: the mind does not need to be merely opened up
or revitalized, but actively rebuilt and made new again. What’s more, the expected result
of that process of remaking is apotheosis—a state high as the lowest lows (actually, even
“more high”), and of disproportionate positive strength. The “virtue” at hand is thus
afforded an increasing amount of semantic and structural heft. It is as if the poet is trying
to not simply achieve imaginative priority but to seize it by means of decisive and
unilateral action.
The revisions to this opening sequence thus evince a misreading which amplifies
or hyperbolizes the function of memory and its constituent “spots” so that the poet might
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master a present anxiety. Yet this anxiety has already been amplified by the very act of
revisiting that scene of creative stagnation: the scene gains force through repetition.17
Whereas the “virtue” of the time-spots was once contained in a relatively terse and almost
organic formula, it is now figured as a polymorphous form or source of discursive power
which above all seeks to be “penetrating” and “efficacious.” This more authoritarian,
positivistic interpretation of the spots trope is fundamentally a defense against anteriority:
the “spots” are at once brought more forcefully into this present and adapted to the
(formal, semantic) demands of the remade Prelude, which has a vastly enlarged scope.
The poet is not the old poet and the poem not the old poem; the immediacy of the 1799
spots sequence—with its spare definition and clearly defined, unembellished edges—has
been supplanted by a reading which attempts to more decisively fix function and
meaning.
Turning to the 1850 text, we find that another decisive shift—this time, perhaps a
hardening—has occurred. The newly revised passage reads as follows:
This efficacious spirit chiefly lurks
Among those passages of life that give
Profoundest knowledge to what point, and how,
The mind is lord and master—outward sense
The obedient servant of her will. Such moments
Are scattered everywhere, taking their date
From our first childhood. I remember well, . . . (1850 12.19-25)
For the most part, this version of the passage appears to be a taut, economical rendering
of the 1805 text. Despite condensing eleven lines to seven and three sentences to two, it
retains many of the elements introduced by its precursor. However, the slight differences
17

In returning to the poem, Wordsworth is experiencing that state of blockage again, not only in figurative
terms but also literally. Recall, for example, that evidence points to a scenario wherein every time progress
on The Recluse was stifled (as it would be again and again), Wordsworth would turn to his
autobiographical poem for solace and succor. The irony of the situation is that this defense and supposed
comfort would actually compound influence-anxiety.
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are telling. For example, consider the change from “those passages of life in which / We
have had deepest feeling that the mind / Is lord and master” to “those passages of life that
give / Profoundest knowledge to what point, and how, / The mind is lord and master . . . ”
(emphasis added). In the former version, the “passages of life” (the spots) are located in a
moment wherein we “have had deepest feeling”—meaning, they are coincident with that
feeling. In the latter, these same passages “give” instead, which implies a separation
(temporal or spatial) between the spot or experience which is giving and the mind which
is receiving (emphasis added). When coupled with the contrast between “deepest feeling”
and “Profoundest knowledge,” this revision suggests an attempt to fix the spots in / as an
external “source” which might be interpreted, manipulated, and controlled according to
the will of the poet. Knowing “to what point, and how” something works is the
equivalent of making it an impersonalized object of study. Paradoxically, this attempt to
control the spots on one front is coupled with a diminishment of the apparent authority
granted the mind; the poet’s deepest feeling no longer tells him that the mind is
unequivocally lord and master but instead presupposes that there is a point (an upper
limit) and a way (a delimited means of operation) determining how extensive the mind’s
government over “outward sense” can actually be.
Though it may appear to contradict previous comments about the control a
subsequent text attempts to exercise over its precursor, one must realize that a tempering
or lessening is also a form of interpretive control. “All restitutions or representations,”
Bloom writes, “induce fresh anxieties, and the influence process continues by a
compensatory fresh limitation . . . ” (Map 72). In other words, one poem’s defense
against the threat of (an)other—its attempt to seize priority over the precursor poem—
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will not always be an act of overt domination. Often, it will take the form of an
antithetical movement (or swerve) away from the previous poem, even if the specific
limitation, substitution, or restitution appears to be a concession to the precursor’s
potency. Furthermore, Wordsworth’s implicit doubt concerning the extent of the mind’s
power to dominate “outward sense”—however stringent his control of syntax—speaks to
a discernable pattern in the relationship(s) between his texts: a supplementary yet often
unpredictable vacillation between what Wolfson terms “floating and fixing” (Formal
101). One must keep this antinomy in mind; patterns of misreading may not abide by
static principles. Instead, the shape of the text’s movement away from its precursor, and
the result(s) of that movement, will always depend upon a very specific collision of
contexts.
Involuted questionings aside, the “lord and master” addition to the “spots of time”
sequence also initiates another consummately Wordsworthian response to the anxiety of
influence: a reflexive or inward turn wherein poetry becomes meta-poetic—or, in simpler
terms, a moment of writing about writing. Whereas the 1799 Prelude, as Jonathan
Wordsworth aptly observes, contains very little material which is explicitly about
writing, the superbly self-conscious 1805 Prelude continually reflects upon its own
compositional processes. Thus, when one encounters the phrase “passages of life” at line
269 (emphasis added), the double entendre can hardly be a coincidence. “Manuscripts as
well as memories constitute [Wordsworth’s] past,” and the passages of his life are at once
analogous to and enshrined within the lines of his poetry (Wolfson, Formal 104). Given
the shift toward poetry as a subsurface subject, the shift from “deepest feeling” to
“profoundest knowledge” is a sign of the elder ephebe’s shifting priorities or, to come
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back around to a previous interpretation, more evidence of the poet’s attempt to distance
himself from (and thus defend himself against) the 1805 Prelude’s forceful reading of the
potency of the poetic mind. Yet the hint present in “passages” mostly anticipates the
much more explicit and resonant meta-poetic meditations beginning at line 293 in the
1805 Prelude:
The gibbet-mast was mouldered down, the bones
And iron case were gone, but on the turf
Hard by, soon after that fell deed was wrought,
Some unknown hand had carved the murderer’s name.
The monumental writing was engraven
In times long past, and still from year to year
By superstition of the neighborhood
The grass is cleared away; and to this hour
The letters are all fresh and visible.
Faltering, and ignorant where I was, at length
I chanced to espy those characters inscribed
On the green sod: . . . . (1805 11.293-301)
The equivalent passage in the 1850 text reads as follows:
The gibbet-mast had mouldered down, the bones
And iron case were gone; but on the turf,
Hard by, soon after that fell deed was wrought,
Some unknown hand had carved the murderer’s name.
The monumental letters were inscribed
In times long past; but still, from year to year,
By superstition of the neighborhood,
The grass is cleared away, and to that hour
The characters were fresh and visible:
A casual glance had shown them, and I fled,
Faltering and fain, and ignorant of the road: (1850 12. 237-47)
Significantly, this portion of the main descriptive sequence constituting the “Murderer at
Penrith” episode is absent from the five book and two book versions of The Prelude. As
such, it constitutes an entirely different reading of the scene. While the early incarnations
of the poem fix the murderer’s resting place in a “long green ridge of turf . . . / Whose
shape was like a grave,” the 1805 and 1850 Preludes identify the scene of his death by
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means of a written marker. Moreover, this shift in the means whereby death is “read” is
accompanied by an equally significant alteration to the tone of the passage: whereas the
young Wordsworth simply departs the site of the murderer’s death in the early versions
with no mention of panic or fear (“I left the spot / And, reascending the bare slope . . .”),
the child in the later versions is obviously frightened. Although both texts explicitly
connect the child’s panic to the writing (the writing is mentioned prior to his leaving the
spot, and thus becomes a possible cause by proximity), and although both mention a
hasty retreat from the scene, the 1850 text makes this much more explicit: “Faltering, and
ignorant where I was, at length / I chanced to espy those characters inscribed / On the
green sod: forthwith I left the spot” becomes “A casual glance had shown them, and I fled
/ Faltering and fain, and ignorant of the road” (emphasis added).
Of course, the child’s fear is perfectly explicable, and one might well read the
1850 text’s emphasis on panic as Wordsworth’s attempt to make the scene more dynamic
or dramatic. Nevertheless, this sense of apprehension, urgency, and anxiety is connected
explicitly to written language; it is as if this particular passage of life has internalized the
anxieties of the mature poet, substantiating his fear not only of crises related to writing
but of stagnant, static, “engraven,” “inscribed,” or fixed letters and language. The name
carved on the turf (notably, a name omitted from the text) is Death metonymically
configured; by extension, mortality consists of being written down—permanently—in a
form which cannot be altered or revised. In her study of Wordsworthian revision, Susan
Wolfson explains this aversion to textual fixity as follows:
Once a specter shape is given a definite form and is turned into a simulacrum of a
literary artifact, the life of the subjective eye and I, produced by motion and ferment,
dies. Long before de Man articulated the negativity behind language, Wordsworth
staged as much in passages such as this: mastery is death. (Formal 131)
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Without venturing too deeply into a discussion of the alignment between fixity and death
(note Wordsworth’s famous line, “lifeless as a written book”), and of revision as “the
energy which postpones death and quickens the mind”18 (Wolfson, Formal 131), it is
nevertheless important to note how this interpretation of “monumental writing” pertains
to our discussion of “spots of time” (in all of the aforementioned senses) and spots, or
moments, of self-reading. To put it succinctly, the amplified sense of panic visible in the
1850 text is, first, a manifestation of Wordsworth’s anxieties concerning the viability of
his efforts to read the past; and second, a sign and exemplary instance of the revisionary
ratio (or mode of misreading) which dominates and eventually attenuates Wordsworth’s
later poetry. Here, in the transition from the 1805 to 1850 texts, there is a discernable
pattern of “fixing” sites, spots, and scenes that reveals the later Wordsworth’s attempts to
stabilize, clarify, and therefore usurp previous readings. However, the poet’s effort to
refine and preserve the spots of time has an unintended consequence: “monumental
writing” becomes one of the text’s dominant figures of / for reading, and that figure
enacts the duality the phrase portends.
The evidence for this pattern of misreading is profuse. First, one finds explicit
indicators in a series of grammatical changes: “The gibbet-mast was mouldered down”
becomes “the gibbet-mast had mouldered down,” suggesting, by means of a tense shift,
that the later narrator has extirpated himself from the scene. This is reinforced by the
change, a few lines later, from “to this hour / The letters are all fresh and visible” to “to
that hour / The characters were all fresh and visible.” Though subtle, these alterations
drastically alter the dynamic of Wordsworth’s spot-reading: in the 1805 text, he revisits

18

Wolfson has already covered this territory quite thoroughly. For more information, see the fourth chapter
of Formal Charges, entitled “Revision as Form: Wordsworth’s Drowned Man.”
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the scene and actively participates in it; in the 1850 text, the scene is placed at arm’s
length—still possessed of potency, no doubt, but diluted. Even more curious, however, is
the puzzling transposition of the terms used to describe the murderer’s epitaph:
“monumental writing” becomes “monumental letters”; “engraven” becomes “inscribed”;
“letters” become “characters”; and the 1805’s final, direct reference to the writing—“to
espy those characters inscribed”—is effaced entirely in favor of the anomalous, pronoundulled phrase “A casual glance had shown them.” In concert, these changes enact a
disintegration of language into its component parts: “Writing,” which suggests the
possibility of reading and therefore of discernable meaning, deconstructs into “letters,”
which are but disconnected symbols when not put into a viable order; likewise, “letters”
(already disconnected symbols) become completely undefined “characters” which,
despite being “fresh and visible,” are basically meaningless. While one could argue
convincingly that the disintegration of language here is symbolic of the de-facement
imposed by death (once again, the murderer is never named), the combined weight of the
child’s panic at the sight of writing and this linguistic disintegration also justify a more
meta-poetic reading. Ultimately, the 1850 Prelude refigures language as an inherently
diminished thing. The fact that the letters and characters cannot be put into order or even
identified is evocative of the illegibility of the past. Like this spot, texts cannot be fully or
accurately read.
Despite Wordsworth’s acute awareness of fundamental (and perhaps ineradicable)
“vacancies” permeating autobiographical discourse, the text of The Prelude refuses to
completely abandon the attempt to read and derive value from the spots of time. As a
result, the revisions to the text prevent the very goal they seek to accomplish. Even as
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they are presumably “enshrining, / . . . the spirit of the Past / For future restoration,”
Wordsworth’s revisions work to countermand the spots’ restorative potential by disabling
their viability in the present. By virtue of Wordsworth’s alterations, the 1850 text
interposes an insurmountable distance between the reader / poet (who is attempting to
derive value from them) and the source or site of the “renovating virtue.” Just before the
opening to the 1850 reading of “Waiting for Horses,” Wordsworth interjects a rather
hasty, abrupt, and unbalanced transition which reads, “Yet another of these memorials.”
This apparently inconsequential segue is an uncannily apt description of the
consequences of Wordsworth’s misreading: the spots of time, conceived and
implemented as a means of actively restoring the imagination to its full potential, are
essentially petrified—writ large, yes, but also written down and engraven in a manner
which no longer permits them to adapt to the exigencies of the poet’s present. Reading
these spots is not the active, phenomenological exercise it once was; it has now become
an exercise in reading gravestones, epitaphs, and “memorials”—static, dead things. Given
these conclusions, the effect of influence-anxiety and the consequences of Wordsworth’s
misreading of his previous self are clear. In the effort to render himself a “monumental”
presence, to “enshrine” his poetry and preserve it for posterity, Wordsworth has also
opened his text to a stultifying and deadening process of reification: images harden,
metaphor and symbol solidify, and the “spots of time” become memories which were and
not the perpetually active founts of “something evermore about to be” (1805 6.542)
Frances Ferguson’s comments on this matter are especially apt:
The poet’s spiritual autobiography virtually constitutes a series of epitaphs spoken
upon former selves, “other Beings,” who can be approached only across vacancies
almost as wide as those between the living and the dead. And Wordsworth’s revisions
substantiate this link between autobiography and epitaph which implies that the
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themes of growth and immortality never stand far from the theme of death. (155)
Of course, this is not an all-encompassing, omni-vitiating process: even by 1850—
indeed, even today—Wordsworth’s poetry still “lives.” Nevertheless, this aspect of the
text exemplifies the process of involuted self-questioning which ultimately led
Wordsworth not just to compulsively revise his material but to attempt to change it by
means of imposing obfuscating layers of (re)interpretation.
One might object that Wordsworth is renowned for his ability to make dead things
speak: Margaret of The Ruined Cottage, Lucy, the various solitaries and wraiths and
vagrants spread throughout his corpus—all are examples of the productive use of
prosopopoeia, which makes epitaphs (of whatever type) much more than simply
collections of static, anonymous “characters.” The evidence to support this point is
undeniable. Nevertheless, the torpor of “monumental writing” is not the only process of
misreading at work in the central “spots of time” sequence. Other moments therein
exemplify the same internecine struggle.
The most important of these moments consists of the following:
When in blessed season,
With those two dear ones—to my heart so dear—
When, in the blessed time of early love,
Long afterwards I roamed about
In daily presence of this very scene,
Upon the naked pool and dreary crags,
And on the melancholy beacon, fell
The spirit of pleasure and youth’s golden gleam—
And think ye not with radiance more divine
From these remembrances, and from the power
They left behind? So feeling comes in aid
Of feeling, and diversity of strength
Attends us, if but once we have been strong. (1805 11.315-27)
The equivalent passage in the 1850 Prelude reads:
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When, in the blessed hours
Of early love, the loved one at my side,
I roamed, in daily presence of this scene,
Upon the naked pool and dreary crags,
And on the melancholy beacon fell
A spirit of pleasure and youth’s golden gleam;
And think ye not with radiance more sublime
For these remembrances, and for the power
They had left behind? So feeling comes in aid
Of feeling, and diversity of strength
Attends us, if but once we have been strong. (1850 12.261-71)
Right away, one detects the same sort of diminishment cited previously: a period
described as a “blessed season” and “blessed time” in 1805 becomes 1850’s paltry
“blessed hours.” Time itself has atrophied, and the spot where Wordsworth “roamed
about / In daily presence of this very scene” seems hardly capable of providing or
sustaining any type of restorative power. However, the more crucial difference is found
between the following lines:
And think ye not with radiance more divine
From these remembrances, and from the power
They left behind? (emphasis added)
And think ye not with radiance more sublime
For these remembrances, and for the power
They had left behind? (emphasis added)
The choice to replace “divine” with “sublime” is curious in and of itself, and perhaps
indicates Wordsworth’s later reluctance to ascribe absolute “divinity” to a faculty of the
human mind. That said, this passage is especially pivotal because it defines how the
“power” of the spots actually operates. Such a need for definition is, first of all,
illustrative of the poet’s inward-turning mind: Wordsworth has essentially become a
critical reader of his own master trope. The difference between the definitions offered
here, though ostensibly slight, is striking when properly explicated, for what initially
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seems a rather innocent alteration in prepositions actually alters the entire character of a
“spot of time.”
First, consider the prepositions encompassing and linking the most crucial terms
in the passage, “remembrances” and “power.” “From,” in the 1805 text, characterizes the
spot and its constituent site, memory, or scene as the origin of “radiance divine.” The
spot is therefore spatiotemporal: it is a place and a time wherein a time-spot (memory, or
the “remembrances”) has become a localized scene (spot of time), and thereby permitted
a doubly productive and doubly powerful fusion of past and place. The “remembrances”
therein described are still available as sources of restorative radiance, for the power they
“left behind” persists.
On the other hand, 1850’s “For” disables the present viability of the spot. It
signifies “because of” and therefore imposes a separation between the spot (cause) and
“radiance sublime” (effect). The remembrances have become reasons or causes for
radiance: they are no longer doubly resonant; they are solely temporal (fixed in time) and
not spatial, which deprives them of the capacity to act as a scene or text revisited. The
effect of the preposition is only enhanced by the shift from “they left behind” to “they
had left behind.” Moving from the simple past to the past perfect, the emended text looks
back from a certain time in the past to tell what had happened before. This means that the
spot or memory is no longer happening, and thus no longer viable. Revision therefore
renders the spot’s power belated and impotent: it is, as it were, a static memorial.
This reading of belatedness finds further support a few lines later in the following
lines, first from 1805:
The days gone by
Come back upon me from the dawn almost
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Of life; the hiding-places of my power
Seem open, I approach, and then they close; (1805 11.333-36)
And then from 1850:
The days gone by
Return upon me almost from the dawn
Of life: the hiding-places of man’s power
Open; I would approach them, but they close. (1850 12.277-80)
Once again, the actual changes are slight, but the effect of those changes is considerable.
In 1805, Wordsworth actually attempts to approach the “hiding places” of his power, but
they close before he can reach them. By 1850, the power has not only been
impersonalized (no longer “my” power but “man’s”), but the poet also no longer even
attempts to approach: he would do so, but they have already closed. Further, although it
might initially seem to undermine such a reading, the absence of “seems” in the later text
actually amplifies the effect of the poet’s immobility. In 1850 the “hiding places”
definitely “open,” but they do so only to close with equal force and thus blatantly rebuke
the poet. Once again, the 1850 Prelude demonstrates its tendency to fix scenes, images,
and (here) positions in a more definitive form. The purgation of “seems” from the text—
in all senses—means that any perceived lack, any failure, and any closing must be more
final.
That said, the aforementioned change is significant predominantly because of how
it inflects the lines which follow in both the 1805 and 1850 texts: “I see by glimpses now,
when age comes on / May scarcely see at all . . .” In 1805, the poet’s anxiety is potent
enough; but by 1850, his blindness has become more severe. The later poet is immobile,
and the gravity fixing him in place further darkens the sense of his capacity to “see” in
the visionary mode offered by those powers formerly open to him.
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Ultimately, these lines represent Wordsworth’s most direct (and poignant) lament
at a perceived lack of poetic authority or priority—losses he, like his later readers,
believes to be the consequence of age and a perceived lack of vision. He will, however,
struggle for priority all the same—indeed, he is doing precisely that by doing what his
younger self cannot: rewriting the poem. This portion is conspicuously absent in the 1799
and the five-book versions: in 1805, therefore, one witnesses for the first time a new
anxiety of “sight” (or priority, or poetic vision) and a consequently magnified fear of
mortality.
Finally, we have the closing portions of the central “spots of time” sequence, first
in 1805:
All these were spectacles and sounds to which
I often would repair, and thence would drink
As at a fountain. And I do not doubt
That in this later time, when storm and rain
Beat on my roof at midnight, or by day
When I am in the woods, unknown to me
The workings of my spirit thence are brought. (1805 11.82-88)
And in 1850:
All these were kindred spectacles and sounds
To which I oft repaired, and thence would drink,
As at a fountain; and on winter nights,
Down to this very time, when storm and rain
Beat on my roof, or, haply, at noon-day,
While in a grove I walk, whose lofty trees,
Laden with summer’s thickest foliage, rock
In a strong wind, some workings of the spirit,
Some inward agitations thence are brought,
Whate’er their office, whether to beguile
Thoughts over busy in the course they took,
Or animate an hour of vacant ease. (1850 12.324-35)
Until 1805, this passage persists in a more or less stable form, though a subsequent
address to Coleridge does (in comparison to the end-stopped five-book version)
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somewhat weaken their net effect. However, in 1850 he expands and drastically
attenuates the lines, adding excessive qualification in an attempt to describe how (and
why), exactly, these spectacles and sounds returned. As a result, the preceding spots of
time are rendered somewhat impotent, or at least of vastly diminished importance. In
these revised lines, the “spots of time” sequence—structural and semantic center of The
Prelude—has become something which simply permits the Poet to calm unruly thoughts
or enliven “an hour of vacant ease.” Of course, such hours of ease or tranquility
frequently have great significance for Wordsworth; after all, it is the emotions recollected
in those moments which gather to form a poem. Nevertheless, one cannot completely
disregard the sense of loss or diminishment which emerges from a parallel reading: the
moments which previously evinced such urgency have somehow been domesticated.
“Animate” may be an inherently lively verb, but it cannot thwart the semantic
complacency of “beguile.” As such, the “vacant ease” these lines reference indicates less
a serene interval of tranquility than a period of manifest boredom.
This terminal deflation is the sequence’s final and perhaps most pronounced
instance of misreading. Wordsworth is not deliberately subverting his own master-trope,
but simply attempting to bring it under control by means of reinterpretation. Yet that
imposition, and the layering of selves which results, can only obscure. It is not any
illusory “original” which has been lost but a manifest sense of the “spots of time” as an
active, fructifying source of imaginative restoration. In trying to control interpretation
and fix meaning, Wordsworth has opened up his verse to the lifelessness of a written
book.

Coda: The Anxiety of Design
In comparison to the other spots of time, the famous ascent of Mount Snowdon
has a relatively stable structural location and function in all versions of The Prelude: it
was designed to serve as a climax, and it remains a climax in all manuscripts after the
interim Five Book Prelude of 1804. Even its precise location within the text—at the onset
of the concluding book—remains the same across all versions. In a poem subject to
almost constant change, this is no mean feat: indeed, the ascent of Snowdon is perhaps
The Prelude’s only fixed spot. Yet within that set space and location, Snowdon is more
protean, more heavily altered and rewritten (at least between 1805 and 1850) than any
other passage in the Prelude. As the editors of the Norton Prelude put it, “None of the
other great passages of The Prelude—indeed of Wordsworth’s poetry as a whole—
suffered in revision as did the Ascent of Snowdon. From the earliest reworkings . . . to
the final concession to orthodoxy . . . alterations are consistently for the worse” (461).
This raises an important question: Snowdon has the most clearly defined function
and the most constant location of any “spot of time.” It stands to reason that it ought to be
relatively free from (or perhaps “above”?) the semantic torsion visited upon the other
spots by means of relocation and retasking. Why, then, was this passage so repeatedly
and heavily revised?
The preceding discussion suggests an answer: the greater the narrative, structural,
or semantic pressure on the spot, the greater the poet’s anxiety. For Wordsworth, the
spots are defining moments or loci of poetic identity. As the grand climax of the poem,
Snowdon therefore has a more pivotal role in the figuring or construction of Wordsworththe-Poet than any other spot or, for that matter, any other passage in The Prelude. It holds
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the greatest potential to alter the idea of the poet which emerges from the poem and is the
final justification of his power, his priority, and his autonomy as a creative consciousness.
For this reason, it bears the brunt of Wordsworth’s anxiety—indeed, is the representative
climax of that anxiety. All of Wordsworth’s writing selves converge on this moment and
struggle for ascendency. The result is a passage which is so heavily revised that it loses
almost all of its initial meaning. This is not simply a question of a noticeable decline in
quality, but of a manifest anxiety which distorts the very point of the sequence as a
whole. Each respective Wordsworth attempts to accomplish his own “apocalypse of the
imagination,” and the result is not a passage which expresses the dominance of mind over
nature but a sequence which illustrates the internecine conflict between disparate selves
who are successively demolishing and obliterating previous readings. The point of the
passage, by its own admission, is to both justify and depict (via the resonant image of a
“mighty mind”) the authority, autonomy, and ultimate creative potential of the poetic
mind. The problem is that Wordsworth has taken his own message quite literally with
each successive reading: the text too is something which must be subverted to the
authority of the current poetic self. And in the attempt to swerve from those
representative poetic precursors (a psycho-rhetorical motion rendered hyperbolic due to
the passage’s semantic heft), Wordsworth creates a misreading which is so drastically
different that it can no longer perform its intended function. The poetry no longer “fits”:
the text has been folded upon itself too many times, and the resulting lines and fractures
cannot be effaced.
On the whole, these lines and fractures evince patterns of misreading similar to
those found within the central “spots of time” sequence. Indeed, in the transition from the
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1805 to 1850 Snowdon sequence Wordsworth’s “self-conscious self-consciousness” is
even more acute, as one finds him, for example, worrying openly about his poetic legacy.
Thus the “higher” or poetic minds described in the sequence are, by 1850,
. . . made more prompt
To hold fit converse with the spiritual world,
And with generations of mankind
Spread over time, past, present, and to come,
Age after age, till Time shall be no more. (1850 14.107-11)
Of course, the absence of such reflections on posterity in 1805 isn’t terribly surprising: at
the time of his later revisions, Wordsworth was closer to death and thus more prone to
consider how he might be remembered. Nevertheless, the interposition of this auxiliary
anxiety significantly alters the character of the passage. A similar sentiment is found in
the lines which close the 1805 Snowdon sequence, but what was a positive slant upon
posterity has become (in 1850) an especially urgent question which reaches back toward
the very origins of The Prelude and the Poet himself:
Where is the favored being who hath held
That course unchecked, unerring, and untired,
In one perpetual progress smooth and bright?—
A humbler destiny have we retraced,
And told of lapse and hesitating choice,
And backward wanderings along thorny ways:
Yet—compassed round by mountain solitudes,
Within whose solemn temple I received
My earliest visitations, careless then
Of what was given me; and which now I range,
A meditative, oft a suffering man—. (1850 14.133-43)
Here, Wordsworth essentially de-idealizes the “favored being” whose development was
the Prelude’s point of origin and still is, in many senses, the basis of the poem’s personal
mythology. Instead of positioning himself as one divinely ordained, Wordsworth recounts
a “humbler destiny” wherein the poet has stalled, halted, or been forced to retrace his
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own steps by means of “backwards wanderings along thorny ways.” One might argue that
this thinly-veiled account of the writing of the poem itself is more honest than the
mythologized version—and I cannot disagree. However, the most integral fact about this
passage is that it represents yet another “layering” of consciousness: a meta- which has
metastasized and thus formed another frame of interpretation. Wordsworth’s final
“swerve” is a further movement away from, and defense against, the ecstatic character of
that former “favored being.” Nothing could make this more evident than the 1850’s
conspicuous excision of a line which, in previous versions, held immense significance.
Formerly, Wordsworth had described himself as a “meditative, oft a suffering man,” but
this suffering was offset in the following line: “And yet I trust with undiminished
powers” (1805 13.126-7). In 1850, the latter line does not exist. Wordsworth leaves his
Poet a “meditative, oft a suffering man” and, while subsequent passages will attempt to
recoup this loss, the lingering echoes of diminishment never completely fade.
Yet there is another anxiety at work in the Snowdon sequence—one which cannot
be completely subsumed or described by means of an “anxiety of influence.” It is related
to the latter, even dependent upon it, but the two cannot be conflated. Briefly described,
this second anxiety is that which emerges when one looks beyond the bounds of The
Prelude and toward the body of Wordsworth’s poetry. It is a consequence of the fact that
Wordsworth does not simply want to write a Poet’s autobiography, but to put that Poet to
work in myriad other capacities. The “anxiety of influence” works from within; what I
would like to call “the anxiety of design” spirals outward from The Prelude to subsume
or impose itself upon the entirety of Wordsworth’s corpus. One finds the clearest
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evidence of its existence in a famous passage from Wordsworth’s 1815 Preface to The
Excursion:
Several years ago, when the Author retired to his native mountains with the hope of
being enabled to construct a literary work that might live, it was a reasonable thing
that he should take a review of his own mind, and examine how far Nature and
Education had qualified him for such an employment. As subsidiary to this
preparation, he undertook to record, in verse, the origin and progress of his own
powers, as far as he was acquainted with them. That work, addressed to a dear friend,
most distinguished for his knowledge and genius, and to whom the Author's intellect
is deeply indebted, has been long finished; and the result of the investigation which
gave rise to it, was a determination to compose a philosophical Poem, containing
views of Man, Nature, and Society, and to be entitled the 'Recluse'; as having for its
principal subject the sensations and opinions of a poet living in retirement. The
preparatory poem is biographical, and conducts the history of the Author's mind to the
point when he was emboldened to hope that his faculties were sufficiently matured for
entering upon the arduous labour which he had proposed to himself; and the two
works have the same kind of relation to each other, if he may so express himself, as
the Ante-chapel has to the body of a Gothic church. Continuing this allusion, he may
be permitted to add, that his minor pieces, which have been long before the public,
when they shall be properly arranged, will be found by the attentive reader to have
such connection with the main work as may give them claim to be likened to the little
cells, oratories, and sepulchral recesses, ordinarily included in those edifices. (Prose
3:5)
Such an immense and sprawling design—and this, in addition to (or as an extension of)
The Prelude’s own schema—could hardly fail to yield an anxiety of its own. What’s
more, this anxiety of design and the “anxiety of influence” are bound to clash and
interpenetrate: two discursive forces so titanic could hardly miss one another.
Both of these anxieties result in discernable, substantial, and even drastic
revisions to The Prelude. Further, they are complementary, one working from within and
one from without, but both exerting pressure upon the poet and poem to reconstruct his
past in the textual present. In order to attain a thorough picture of Wordsworth’s
revisionary processes, one would need to follow both of them, ascertain how they collude
or conflict, and apply those insights across the broader scope of the Wordsworthian
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corpus. For now, such an effort is outside the bounds of this study and shall have to be
put on hold. But it remains a work in progress, as I think it ought to be. Wordsworth’s
poetry does not easily permit closure, and neither should his critics. The effort to
understand his ever-unstable texts should remain “something evermore about to be.”
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